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Map of Fiji Archipelago

Source: Parke, 2014
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Note on Pronunciation

The iTaukei language is varied and heterogeneous, but the Bau form is the
officially accepted dialect. Vowels are pronounced softly:
A as in “father”
E as in “enter”
Etc.

However, a few consonants have different pronunciations:
B is “mb” (Bula as in mBula)
C is “th” (Cakabau as in Thakambau)
D is “nd” (Nadi as in Nandi)
G is a soft “ng” (as in sing)
Q is a hard “ng” (as in finger)
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Timeline of Events

1867—King Cakabau of Bau Island establishes ‘unified’ Fiji government
1874—Deed of Cession signed, making Fiji a colony of the British Empire
1879—First Girmitya (Indentured Servants from India) brought to Fiji
1916—Indentured Servitude of Indians Outlawed
1920—General Strike of Indo-Fijians
1930s—Movement to ‘Develop’ the iTaukei population and lands
1940—Creation of Native Land Trust Board
1945—Reorganization of Separate Administration into the Fijian Administration
1970—Fiji Gains Independence
1987—Sitiveni Rabuka leads two coups; in May and September
2000—George Speight leads 3rd coup
2006— 4th coup led by Voreqe Bainimarama, beginning of military regime
2007—Suspension of Great Council of Chiefs by Bainimarama
2012—Dissolution of the Great Council of Chiefs by Bainimarama
2014—First official voting for new Republic, resulting in Fiji First election (headed by
Bainimarama)
2018—Suspension of Village Bylaws Consultation by Bainimarama; second official election
with current constitution
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Abstract

This paper examines the origins, history and social impact of the iTaukei (E-tow-kay)
Administration in Fiji, which is an autonomous system of indigenous dual-power within the
government of Fiji. It traces the history, social implications, and current status of the iTaukei
Administration, focusing on (1) to what extend this administration has frustrated the advances of
liberalism in the form of both nation-state and capitalism, and (2) if there is an alternative to the
dichotomy of cultural, political, and economic domination of chiefly elites versus that of the
global neoliberal hegemony. In this analysis, the origins of developmental discourse is
examined, looking at the colonial government and then chiefly and political elites as creators
and producers of this discourse. Using Social Ecology as a methodology, this paper peels apart
the manifold of conflict that surrounds this administration, consisting of interpenetrating ethnic,
class, economic, and hierarchical conflict. The administration was designed to impede capitalist
expansion in Fiji, yet as time went on the colonial government desired further profit, leading to
the creation of development discourse directed at increasing ‘individualism’ amongst the
iTaukei people. In parallel to this there has been a continuous call for the drawdown of dualpower encapsulated in the iTaukei Administration. The tension between creators of this
discourse—British colonialists, iTaukei chiefly and political elite,—and the iTaukei people is
laid out through a history of the iTaukei Administration. Through this examination, the
importance of non-state directly democratic institutions, such as the localized aspect of the
iTaukei Administration, create and inherent weakness in the State, and allow for the possibility
of cultural autonomy that can be inclusive, as opposed to parochial. It also reveals the
paramount importance of land in struggles to disrupt Capital, and the importance of preserving
or creating communal land control.
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Introduction
All over the world, people are looking for hope. They are looking for a way out of the
seemingly uninterrupted march toward ecological oblivion. It seems that the only major choices
before people are between a globalized marketplace, rushing like an engorged river through
communities, sweeping away their culture, jobs, stability, and even the future itself. In response
to this has risen an opposite pull toward parochialism—most commonly situated at the level of
the nation-state. These movements seek to create a fortress of nationality by rejecting the
homogenizing effects of the global market. These movements are largely reactionary, seeking a
return to a mythologized golden age by expunging the countries they are in of anything deemed
undesirable. This is embodied in places like the USA with the Trump administration, Brazil with
Bolsanaro, of Brexit and the gains of right-wing parties all over Europe, to list just a small few.
Yet when we look closer, we find alternatives to these in blossom all over the world.
Autonomous movements of people not only demanding their future, but building the worlds in
which they want to live. Across the world, there are movements that we can both support and
learn from; especially in the Global South, they are pushing back on these two paths—global
capitalism or fortress nationalism, and building new paths. This is taking place mainly around
Development—for decades countries and peoples have been submitting (willingly or otherwise)
to efforts to become ‘developed’ like the Global North (Mainly US/European countries). Yet
these efforts have consistently fallen flat, leaving many countries poorer and with less resources
than when they began. This is the ferment in which movements toward a Pluriverse—a world in
which many worlds fit—have taken root.
In the context of the Fijian archipelago, there exists a continuous thread of development
discourse, from before its colonization in 1875, through independence in 1970, across four
coups, and into the current day. This discourse was created by European settlers and
missionaries, and carried on by ethnic and political elites into the current day. Fiji is an
archipelago of over 300 islands located in the Oceania region. Its ethnic groups are comprised of
a majority of indigenous Fijians—the iTaukei (E-tow-kay). The largest minority are Indo-Fijians
(descended from indentured servants), and small percentages of other ethnic groups, including
the Rotuman (a small island included in the colonization of Fiji). It is one of the most
economically developed states in the region, based largely on tourism and exports like sugar
cane and fish, yet economic growth has been relatively slow due to the coups it has
experienced—most recently in 2006. The economy has grown, even if slowly, and the level of
poverty has been increasing—revealing a widening gap between rich and poor, with the former
having readier access to developmental programs, further increasing the disparity
(Sriskandarajah, 2003; UNICEF, 2007). As of 2006 Fiji had a Human Development Index of
0.758 (UNICEF, 2007) and has been holding relatively steady in this position. The average life
expectancy is 69; the leading health risk factors are from non-communicable diseases (NCDs)—
like heart disease, diabetes, and stroke—lack of exercise, and high rates of smoking (WHO,
2015).
Development has meant the imposition of Western political, social, and economic
power, in collaboration with emergent and dominant Fijian chiefly elites. As has been pointed
out by Escobar (2012) and others (Shiva, 2016; Peet, 2015), the creation of “developing
countries” is not something that is merely imposed on a people; they become complicit, seeing
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themselves as subjects of development. In looking at Fiji, this cultural shaping is embodied in
the chiefs of the eastern isles and the formation of the institution variously called the Separate
Administration, the Fijian Administration, and the iTaukei Administration currently embedded
in the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs (Lason & Aminzade, 2008; Macnaught, 2016; Norton, 2012).
From their collaboration with European settlers in the early 1800’s against the people of Viti
Levu (Fiji’s largest island) and the western islands, to today with the undercurrent of political
and cultural dominance, the chiefs of this eastern region still hold sway.
Currently, though, the political and cultural dominance of eastern chiefs is being
dissolved, as the 2006 coup and its attendant narratives show (Lal, 2012). It is being replaced
with a more liberal vision. There are a few interesting implications—both explicit and
implicit—that can be drawn from this emerging reality as it relates to cultural autonomy,
development, Western modernity, and national sovereignty. Many critics of Western
development, liberalism, and capitalism have noted that this vision of progress—development as
the step into modernity—is far too simplistic (Bookchin, 2005; Escobar, 2012; Öcalan, 2017;
Shiva, 2016). As we will see, with the eclipse of the iTaukei Administration and the chiefly
system associated with it, a space is opening up for the liberalization of Fiji—politically,
economically, and culturally. This, taken in the common understanding of development, is seen
as a great step forward—after all, the iTaukei Administration is built on the hereditary transition
of power, land, and political influence, as well as the de facto exclusion of other ethnicities and
cultures. Yet there is more to it than this; its core is an institution of communal land control as
well as apparatuses (sometimes latent, sometimes active) for directly democratic control of
development.
For movements looking to learn ways of building a different world, Fiji offers many
interesting and unique opportunities. In living and serving in Fiji over the last two years I have
come to see the vibrancy and self-creation of communities here, as well as ways of living that
are in themselves acts of resistance to both capitalist and state penetration. Yet there is also in
Fiji a divide that parallels the rest of the world, the tension between entrenchment in global
capitalist markets and an ethno-nationalism centered on iTaukei chiefly elites. The questions I
want to explore in this paper are:
1) to what extent has the iTaukei Administration frustrated the advances of liberalism in
the form of the nation-state and capitalism, and
2) is there an alternative to the dichotomy of cultural, political, and economic domination
of chiefly elites versus that of the global neoliberal hegemony?
In so doing, I hope to be able to find takeaways on methods to disrupt the nation-state
and capitalism, as well as the potential of Fiji as a place of resistance. I will first trace the thread
of the eastern chiefly elite through colonization and statehood, which is embodied in the
institution of the iTaukei Administration, along with its conflict with the Indo-Fijians—who
were brought as indentured servants. I will then examine the four coups through the connecting
discourse of nation building and liberalization. This will be accomplished through looking at the
work of various authors discussing the weakness of Fijian government in its attempt to form a
multi-ethnic liberal nation-state, and the conflict this causes with the existing iTaukei
Administration (Hegarty et al, 2013; Larson & Aminzade, 2008; Naidu, 2013; Sayed-Khaiyum,
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2002). In doing so I hope to tease apart the manifold of conflict and pinpoint specific pieces that
have caused state weakness and slowed the penetration of the cash economy in rural areas. This
will also help create space to look for potential outlets from the cul-de-sac of hegemonic
neoliberalism and reactionary nationalism.
Using a social ecological methodology, explained below, I then will examine an
alternative to the narrative of the positives of Western modernity and accepting the de facto
regimes of the nation-state and capitalism; along with the hindrance that the cultural autonomy
of the iTaukei Administration presents to this. Within this discourse, an opportunity emerges
that allows us to look at possibilities other than the cultural alienation and economic domination
of neoliberalism and the parochial, reactionary retreat into an imagined past that has been
swallowing the globe over the last decade or more. This alternative is neither one of
homogenization nor ethnic/national chauvinism, but of Unity-in-Diversity, a method of multicultural autonomy as well as a cultural interdependence sketched by Murray Bookchin to denote
the importance of fecund, evolving humanitas expressed in the many ethnic and cultural
sensibilities around the world, in contravention to a homogenizing ‘oneness’ of development
discourses around globalization, where culture is reduced to a matter of consumption.

Hall 11

Methodology

In looking at the framework from which to approach the understanding of the history and
present context of Fiji and its people, I will use social ecology (SE) as the dominant method of
inquiry. It was developed largely by theorist Murray Bookchin through the 1960’s and into the
early 2000’s, and continued by others after his death in 2006. Social ecology holds tremendous
potential as a method of critique and inquiry, as it is fundamentally a synthesis of the Marxist
critique of capitalism combined with the anti-authoritarianism of anarchism and a deeply
ecological outlook (Bookchin et al, 2015, p 25). Originally developed by Bookchin as a tendency
within anarchism (Biehl, 2015), its premise is pithily stated that “the very notion of the
domination of nature by man stems from the very real domination of human by human”
(Bookchin, 2005). Social ecology synthesizes anthropological, sociological, scientific, and
historical theories to posit that systems of domination and control have developed within the
social sphere of humankind, and then spread into our very conception of the biotic world,
rendering it from a fecund process of evolution and complexity into a stilted pile of resources
over which we are destined to rule (Bookchin, 2005; Chodorkoff, 2014).
In this conception, social ecology provides a nexus for many varied forms of critique to
slot into, allowing unique analyses to come together into a coherent whole. This gives SE an
ability to evolve and diversify, rather than becoming a rote series of dogmatic tenets to be
digested and regurgitated. In this way, it can maintain its integrity as a method of inquiry while
including an ever more diverse system of critique. Feminism, anti-racism, anti-capitalism,
utopianism, post-scarcity, urban design, and indigenous liberation can all be synthesized
together, yet taken separately as needed. It also explicitly rejects aspects of environmental and
ecology movements that rely on mysticism or misanthropic tenets—particularly in the deep
ecology movement (Bookchin, 2005). We do not need to treat the life of a human the same as a
mosquito, nor do we need to posit that the earth is a goddess that must be protected with prayer
and worship. It also rejects an anthropocentric view of human dominion over nature.
This method of inquiry is not merely negative—it also constructs positive visions of the
future, and an ethics that is grounded in the natural world. These ethics come from the
understanding of nature as a process of evolution toward greater diversity, complexity and
subjectivity (Chodorkoff, 2014). While the ethical formulation of SE is explicitly plastic and
subject to change as we come to understand more about our universe, there are some basic points
that can be pointed to as foundational principles: “If our goal is an ecological society our ethics
must ensure complex, diverse societies and cultures that encourage ever-greater degrees of selfconsciousness, characterized by respect, participation, equity, and scientific understanding”
(Chodorkoff, 2014, p. 149).
Social ecology has the potential to provide alternative pathways to reaching ‘the good
life’ by showing alternatives to centralization, domination, and capitalist exploitation. While this
description is by no means exhaustive, it does point out central ideas such as the reharmonization
of humanity with the biotic world, directly democratic institutions separate and against the State,
and an emphasis on diverse and participatory culture building. These things lend themselves to a
unique vision of development, and one that has been articulated in various ways by groups
calling for an end to development-as-usual.
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In doing this, a social ecological outlook seeks to connect disparate phenomena into a
coherent whole. Bookchin makes a crucial point on the concept of a formless, shapeless whole
versus a carefully constructed, variegated one by saying that wholeness “is not to be mistaken for
a spectral ‘oneness’ that yields cosmic dissolution in a structureless nirvana; it is a richly
articulated structure with a history and internal logic of its own” (Bookchin, 2005, p. 87). This
points to a methodology, not of reduction, but of complexity and gradation—giving it the
sensitivity to negotiate the manifold components of our reality. Bookchin goes on to lay out one
of the key principles of social ecology: “ecological wholeness is not an immutable homogeneity
but rather the very opposite—a dynamic unity in diversity” (p. 88). This becomes the political,
philosophical, and ethical positions that Bookchin in his later years formulated as a
Communalism, a tendency separate both from Marxism and anarchism. The political aspect is
known as libertarian municipalism (Biehl, 2013) and the philosophical aspect as dialectical
naturalism (Bookchin, 2017).

Ecological vs. Environmental

Social ecology distinguishes itself from liberal forms of environmental analysis in a
number of ways. One concept that has persisted in popular environmentalist discourse is a focus
on Malthusian notions of population control. This is especially prevalent in discourse on
sustainable development, where impoverished and formerly colonized countries are tasked with
bringing birth rates down (Escobar, 2012). This notion slips easily into misanthropy, and
misconstrues the deleterious effects of corporations and capital as the product of ‘humanity’—
thereby forcing a child burning trash to bear the same weight of blame as an oil executive or
weapons manufacturer. Another environmentalist concept that dovetails with this is the fetish of
preserving a narrowly defined ‘nature’. By this I mean that wildlife preservation can be given
priority over the preservation of humanity, impinging on indigenous lifeways through enclosure
and cutting off an ecological region from the potential for sensitive human support. One of the
important conceptions of SE is of nature, not as stingy and withholding, but as a fecund and
giving ‘unfolding’—especially with the help and support of humanity (Bookchin, 2005). In
addition to this is the emphasis of individual habits to resist environmental destruction—
changing lightbulbs, buying organic food, etc. While these things certainly have a place in
reorienting people to a more ecological mindset, it is not nearly enough to combat the ecological
destruction wrought by militaries or resource extraction such as fracking or corporate oil
consumption.
SE seeks to navigate between the misanthropy of deep ecology/environmentalist
movements and the anthropocentric tendencies of other movements (notably Liberalism) that see
nature as a pile of resources to be exploited for human interests. This is encapsulated in the
formulation of First and Second Nature. First nature, according to Bookchin, is the entirety of the
biotic world, understood as a constant unfolding of potential—as evolution itself (Bookchin,
2005). This includes humanity, and those things that humans have built and wrought on this
planet (and others). Second nature is conceived as the social world and institutions built by
humans themselves and, while still embedded within First nature, is an aspect unique to
humanity. Sometimes second nature is erroneously taken to be part of ALL nature (Bookchin,
2004). For example, people might look at collections of animals, and consider them organized
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into a hierarchy (one may hear talk of lobsters and chickens’ ‘pecking order’ as exhibiting such
hierarchies). This then is used as a way to normalize hierarchy in human society as something
eternal and indeed natural. The notion of hierarchy itself is a human conception that has been
projected into First nature. Hierarchy, properly conceived, is a social ordering through
institutions. Bookchin traces this development in The Ecology of Freedom (2005), discussing the
development of hierarchy within humanity as a precondition for the idea of nature as something
that can be dominated and consisting of hierarchies (consider the naked ideology in discussing
the ‘animal kingdom’).
There is potential for the synthesis of First and Second Nature as ‘nature rendered selfconscious’, according to Bookchin (2005). This is described as the state when humanity rids
itself of hierarchy and comes to live with nature, not as a passive watcher, but taking an active
hand in shaping a more fecund nature. Since humanity itself is part of nature, if we can take a
generative hand in nature itself humanity can fulfil this potential of nature rendered selfconscious. This is not a forgone conclusion, however; there is no concept of teleology within SE.
There is ‘potential’ which can either be met, or not (Bookchin, 2017). Part of meeting this is for
humanity to extricate itself from all forms of hierarchy and domination, for as stated above our
ecological problems are rooted in our notions of domination and control. These hierarchies
include the class conflict explicated by Marx, but also the various forms of domination that are
not related to economic class—hierarchies of race, gender, ethnicity, religion, colonization, etc.
are all included. In addition, the State itself is understood as an institution based on domination
and control, and any attempt to flatten hierarchy must be prepared to dissolve the State (Biehl,
2013). This critique of hierarchy has many repercussions, both positive and negative. One of
these is the critique of technology; in many societal commentaries popular today technology
receives blame for alienating us, killing our imagination, harming the environment, encouraging
resource exploitation, and much more. The point that SE makes is that technology is essentially
neutral, but embedded in our broader social matrix (Chodorkoff, 2014). In a society based on
domination, exploitation and control, technology will reflect these aspects. The upshot is that a
society based on equitable relationships and freedom will have technology that reflects these
things.
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Positionality
Complementing the social ecological framework I have laid out above I will include my
own experience and positionality, in order to better situate both the research and myself within it.
This project was borne of conversations I had during my service in Peace Corps Fiji, starting in
September 2017. As of this writing, I am serving in a village setting in Western Fiji (Ba
Province), under the Peace Corps framework of Community and Youth Empowerment. As part
of this I teach Health Science at the village primary school, as well as conduct health and
sanitation sessions within the village. I have also worked with the youth group (ages 18-35) and
Mothers’ Club on skill development. The structure of the Peace Corps also requires that I share
the history and culture of the United States, which I regard as an extension of imperial soft power
into areas vulnerable to neo-colonial exploitation through globalized capitalism.
I am a cisgender white heterosexual male, from a working class background. As such, I
have been afforded special privileges within the village, being seen as someone “who was sent to
help civilize us” (quoted from a host-country national when we were discussing my reason for
being in the village). As part of my service, I have been working to dispel the myths and
expectations surrounding Western development, and emphasizing the strengths already apparent
within the community, which I will explain further below. This desire to decolonize my service
led me to look into the local customs of culture, history and development. During discussions
with my host family and Peace Corps local staff, they explained the structure of the village
meetings, land ownership, and the culture of kerekere, an indigenous practice of mutual aid.
Through these discussions, I came to desire to understand the history of the iTaukei people and
the link between the limited intrusion of the cash economy into rural areas with the practices of
direct democracy and communal land ownership. Being from the United States, I have only ever
experienced culture and relationships as something closer to transactions or commodities. As
such it was a shock to see the free (literally) flow of food, drink, work and material by the people
of Fiji. Given my embeddedness in an iTaukei village, as well as the focus of the Peace Corps
itself on rural (overwhelmingly iTaukei) areas, my perspective is necessarily skewed—yet I wish
to express my deepest respect for both Indo-Fijian and Rotuman peoples and the half of the
country living in urban areas. Being in the country has enabled me to learn the iTaukei language
(the national language is English, and is the language of government and the cities), engage in
both formal and informal conversations with Fijians of all ethnicities, and have access to
research materials that would otherwise be unavailable.
I live on the main island of Fiji—Viti Levu—where most of the main towns are, as well
as the capital of Suva. I live in the West in the mountains. It’s an interesting experience to be
surrounded by mountains, and forget that I am on an island most days. Because of my unique
position in Fiji, I am able to experience some of the lived reality of being in the ‘less
hierarchical’ culture (as opposed to a more rigidly hierarchical East). In many places there are
rigid rules for comportment inside a village, women must wear a sulu (sarong), one cannot wear
hats, sunglasses, ‘up’ hair, or sometimes even shoes. In my village these rules are not there,
though guests still wear sulus. The houses are grouped together, with people’s farms being out in
the vanua (countryside). Horses, cows, goats, and chickens roam around, sometimes through the
village, but mainly in the countryside. In many villages, a chief leads the village and has a
special place, yet in my village the turaga ni koro (village headman), and elected position, leads
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meetings and makes village announcements. My area is heavily Catholic, yet in the village there
are several other denominations as well, making for an interesting mix of Christian faith-based
activities.
The village has its own primary school, a Catholic school where I teach health science to
years 3, 4, 5, and 6. The schools seem to be similar to Australian or British ones, where the
teachers recite notes and the children are expected to copy them. I have attempted to do more
experiential teaching, which has met with limited success in some ways. The children, though
boisterous and cheeky outside of school, are reluctant to be called on in class, or to offer any
opinions on issues raised. In one instance, I called on a student to answer a question, and they
refused to answer (I had heard them say the desired answer earlier, so I knew they knew it), just
sitting in their seat with their heads down. After a year of mixing note taking with more
interactive methods, though, the students have become more animated and are more willing to
participate, especially if the lesson involves games.
Houses are simple, most made from a frame of timber and walled with corrugated iron.
Many of the houses in my village were blown away in 2015 from cyclone Winston, which
devastated Fiji and from which many areas are still struggling to recover. As such, new houses
are built with a base of concrete and cinder block, with corrugated iron covering the upper walls
and the roof. We have access to water, though I must filter or boil it because our dam is open and
animals poop in it/ fruit falls in and rots. There is a water filtration system at the front of the
village, but it sits unused and broken—water sanitation is not a high priority in the village,
though this has been changing through engagement and discussions. We have access to fairly
stable electricity, thanks to the proximity of the Vatukoula gold mine. Cell phones are common,
especially amongst my generation, but otherwise appliances are rare. Those families that have
TVs or refrigerators are met often with a kerekere.
Kerekere can be loosely translated as “please”, but contains within it a lot of deeper
connotations. As stated above, there is a mutual aid network the people call the ‘kerekere
system’, where you can rely on members of the community to provide just about anything—
indeed, in my research for this paper I came across instances of people asking for TVs, lamps,
furniture, and much more. One can walk to any house and sit in for a meal, or ask for a place to
stay. No one in a village will lack for food or a place to sleep. In addition, it is customary to work
together on projects—if you are building a house, the men in the village will come to help, and
the women will come with tea and baked goods. A heightened level of communal culture in this
case comes with a diminished individual or private culture, which was a hard adjustment as
someone from the USA. Open doors are the norm, and if yours are closed people become curious
as to why. It is part of the culture to come and sit, smoke, play music, drink kava, and eat at
someone’s house out of the blue. So, some days turn into impromptu parties. Some people have
jobs, but mostly people look after subsistence farms of cassava, dalo, bele, and other crops.
Mangoes and papaya are seasonal treats, along with guava. Typically, people will go in the early
morning before sunrise to move cattle and horses to different pasture, weed their crops as
needed, or get firewood. If there is any labor to be done (building, repair, or similar things) these
are done in the morning. Once lunch comes around, the village gets a lot quieter as people eat
and then spend the next few hours vaka cequ, or resting. Walking thru the village at this time will
show people in each house laying on the floor sleeping, playing cards, or chatting.
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I find this an interesting contrast to my own experience, because I grew up in a rural
farming community and the differences are stark indeed. As opposed to agricultural plots farmed
by family or clan for subsistence, the area I grew up in has miles of either corn or soybean
farmed by one or two families. Houses are spaced hundreds of yards or miles apart, and there is
no real coherent community. In the village in Fiji it is possible to live for weeks or months
without needing money of any kind, since there is no rent to be paid, food is easily pulled from
the ground, and water is available—which represents how little the cash economy has penetrated
into rural Fiji. Yet in the US (even in rural areas) one has no other option but to participate in the
cash economy. Some people in the village sell things, there is a canteen for things like oil, flour,
and the like—however, most of these money-making projects are run as cooperatives, where
people buy in and receive a payout after so many months. To my mind, these differences
represent the extent to which relationships have turned into mere transactions in the US—a
symptom of the deleterious effects of capitalism on social relations.
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Origins and History of the iTaukei Administration

To begin our analysis, we must examine the form and content of the iTaukei
Administration, to see the extent of its impact in Fiji. As with any historical telling, there is much
that must necessarily be omitted for brevity and coherence, but which is still important. In 1875,
Fiji officially became a British colony under the Deed of Cession (Macnaught, 2016). The Deed
was the product of the self-styled King of Fiji, Ratu Cakabau, and representatives of the British
government. While this agreement purported to include all the islands of Fiji, the people of the
western areas were not included in this decision, and initially refused to go along with its
stipulations (Norton, 2012). The western section of Fiji is historically less hierarchical, and did
not consider itself to be under the rule of King Cakabau—who was an eastern chief—which
meant his agreement was an overreach of power (Macnaught, 2016). To prevent widespread
rebellion and resentment of British rule, the first Governor of Fiji, Arthur Gordon, organized a
regiment of eastern Fijians to go and suppress uprisings in the west. We can see this as classic
divide-and-conquer strategy used in European colonialism of favoring a minority against others.
Once this one done, Gordon created the Separate Administration to help execute the policy of
indirect rule in Fiji.
The Separate Administration (later re-named the Fijian Administration, then again to the
iTaukei Administration) was an attempt to codify what the British knew of local cultural
practices into law, and to ensure that they worked to empower colonial rule. This administration
bracketed out the iTaukei population from the governmental and economic functioning of the
colony, because the apparatuses of governance used to control the European capitalist settlers
was incompatible with the various lifeways of the indigenous people (Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002).
Gordon felt strongly about the preservation of the iTaukei culture, and as such the administration
was meant to structure a hermetic system of governance (and control) that would allow the
colonialists to conduct their business without entanglement from the iTaukei themselves. It was
meant to be a brake on development of the indigenous people, as Sayed-Khaiyum (2002) points
out:
Gordon believed the Indigenous Fijians had to be buffered from the rigours of the
everyday capitalist/commercialised life, which the European settlers had evolved
to handle and handle well. Indigenous Fijians needed guidance to slowly ease
them into the next stage of evolutionary development as it were. In the meantime
Gordon decided the Indigenous Fijians needed protection from the ‘other’, the
European settler, in particular the unscrupulous ones (p. 32).
From this we can see a paternalistic attitude towards the iTaukei, and the plan to slowly
‘develop’ them into the highest form of culture—Europeans. This is the beginning of a push-andpull between development, westernization, and the penetration of the capitalist economy and that
of the traditional lifeways of the iTaukei people. This tension will persist through the rest of the
history of Fiji up to the present day (as explained though this paper).
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Broadly sketched, the system broke the Fiji into 12 yasana (provinces), later expanded to
14, with each yasana containing a varying number of tikina (districts). The koro, or village, is the
smallest unit. Each of these units has a chief, or tui that is in charge—the Roko Tui for the
province, Buli for the district, various local chiefs, and the Turaga Ni Koro (translated as ‘village
headman’) at the village level (Parke, 2014). Each of these communal units has its own council,
which meet together to take care of issues, and then meet with the next level up to confer. For
example, in my area we have a bose va koro (village meeting) every month, and then every three
months the Tikina chief will come to meet with our village and discuss issues pertaining to the
district. The village level is guided by a set of created village bylaws, which vary from village to
village. In addition, the chiefs of the village and the village headman will meet every quarter of
the year to collaborate on district issues and nominate members to the provincial council
meeting, held twice a year (Rotuivaqali, 2012). The provincial councils help to coordinate
development within the villages, from infrastructure to investment. They are also empowered to
create and run public-private corporations and cooperatives in order to help economic
development in rural areas and generate iTaukei controlled capital, but as Rotuivaqali (2012)
notes in her survey on provincial accountability, graft and corruption of those in charge (many of
them of chiefly status) is rampant.
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Roko Tui

Tikina (District)
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Issues discussed pertained to tax collection, issues raised by the communities about sickness,
religion, infrastructure, and culture. It should also be noted that the Separate Administration was
conceived exclusively as a rural institution, and never extended into city/town areas. Part of the
administration was meant to structure the lives of the iTaukei people, from marriage and divorce,
laws forbidding fornication, and to prevent iTaukei peoples from leaving their villages without
permission from a chief, which stayed in place largely until 1967 (Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002). This
essentially rural conception will pose many challenges in the future, as towns and cities grown
and the iTaukei begin to move freely into them.
These chiefs were codified into law as hereditary positions within the various mataqali,
or clans. The exception to this was the village headman, who was chosen to act as a secretary and
administrator to the local village chiefs (Macnaught, 2016). The most powerful of these clans
would form confederations with each other, and a bose vakaturaga (Council of Chiefs) was
created with the chiefs of these confederations and various powerful clans to be the head of the
Separate Administration, with Gordon himself as the lead chief (Norton, 2012). This council was
later renamed the Bose Levu Vakaturaga (Great Council of Chiefs). These chiefs conferred with
the colonial government, passed down decrees and delivered taxes collected by their provinces.
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It is important to note that chiefly status before colonization was not typically hereditary.
As Aubrey Parke states: “Dominant status and leadership mainly depended on achievement
rather than on birth, reflecting individual ambition, internal rivalry and success in war” (2014, p.
13). The liminal state of the chiefs is confirmed by Timothy Macnaught (2016), who says:
A traditional chief presiding over the cycle of service and tribute, drawing together
the constituent groups of a local society under the aegis of ancestral and other gods,
was only superficially the autocratic paterfamilias he seemed to outsiders. In truth he
was at one intersection of a flexible web of horizontal and hierarchical ‘paths of the
land’ (p. 3).
For a more thorough diagram of the structure of the iTaukei Administration, please see the
example in the front matter. This is crucial to understand; the mutable nature of the iTaukei
chiefly position becomes institutionalized and ossified into a monolithic structure through British
colonization, which sets up one of the intertwining conflicts explored in this work. Where once
culture was held by chiefs as a matter of ritual, the creation of the Separate Administration
conferred significant political power onto the position, creating what Macnaught calls a
“neotraditional identity” (2016). In conferring this power in the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC)
made up of mostly eastern chiefs, he also set the stage for another thread of conflict.
In creating this Separate Administration, Gordon also ensured that the land of Fiji would
be inalienable from the mataqali that laid claim to them. This process was fraught, as until
Europeans appeared there was no unified system of land ownership (Macnaught, 2016). Before
Cession, European capitalists were settling in Fiji and taking over land for sugarcane and other
agricultural production. An interesting aspect of this is that many people came to plant cotton,
because the American Civil War had caused prices to skyrocket (Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002, p. 26).
Gordon reversed many of these sales, and codified communal land ownership into law
(Macnaught, 2016). “Native Dealings ordinances limited the amount [of money] that could be
recovered from a Fijian in the courts. Labour recruiting was closely regulated. Alienation of
Fijian land, except to the Crown, was halted, and leases limited to twenty-one years”
(Macnaught, 2016, p. 8). To this day, over 80% of the land in Fiji is owned by the various
mataqali of Fiji. The codification of land rights was a long and contentious process, where any
party wishing to lease land would have to meet with clan leaders who owned the land (“The
Creation of TLTB”, 2018). The leases length was in the beginning up to 21 years. In 1940 the
creation of the Native Land Trust Board (later renamed the iTaukei Land Trust Board)
centralized land leasing under government control on the owners behalf.
The iTaukei Administration effectively created a dual-power administration, with the
GCC having a hand in any legislation and implementation that the Government of Fiji creates
(Appana & Abbott, 2015). I say ‘dual-power’ because this system was implemented parallel to
the colonial government that took care of the aspects of governance that wasn’t deemed to
directly affect the iTaukei population. The Separate Administration applied only to the iTaukei,
and in its current form situated in the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs still holds a separate power for
the iTaukei, who could until 2018 interact with local bylaws, deal with leasing land and
receiving rents all through this Ministry. This is in distinction to other ethnic groups, which have
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to go through the general State apparatus common in the liberal nation-state. In this way, the
iTaukei people have cultural autonomy codified into the government, separate from general State
oversight that others are the subject of. The GCC was seen as the voice of the iTaukei people,
and they met with the Governor of Fiji to advise on policies, in addition to ensuring the decrees
of the British were followed and enforced (Macnaught, 2016).
While the Separate Administration was supposedly implemented in an attempt to
preserve the culture of the people of Fiji, it took a specific part of the Fijian culture, tied to a
specific geography, and raised it up to be a representation of the entirety of Fijian culture. It also
had the effect of ossifying the iTaukei culture at a certain point in time. As John Nation puts it:
“Before cession brought British sovereignty, warfare enabled some places to rise and caused
other places to fall in stature. After Cession the whole order was supposed to have been ‘frozen’
in that warfare could no longer expand or contract the power and status of a vanua and its chiefs”
(1978). The enshrining of the rigid hierarchical organization of the eastern chiefly system helped
to create gatekeepers of Fijian culture, and convenient methods to help institute the will of the
British (Tomlinson, 2006). In this way, we can see the aspect of collaboration that Arturo
Escobar discusses in Encountering Development (2012); colonization was not simply something
forced on the iTaukei people, but something the elite of Fiji actively participated in and shaped.
This included providing taxes, labor, and ensuring that villagers did not leave their villages
without permission (Macnaught, 2016; Rotuivaqali, 2012). The chiefs of Fiji thus became the
official voices of the people, as well as the holders of their culture (Appana & Abbott, 2015).
They also worked with the British administration in Fiji to help implement policies (Macnaught,
2016), turning these chiefly positions into both cultural and bureaucratic positions.
The iTaukei people were confined to their villages, denied common role voting (only the
GCC was allowed to pick government representatives)—power was concentrated in the “chiefly
class”, both politically and culturally (Macnaught, 2016). These laws were kept in place until
1967, just before Independence, with the abolition of the Native Regulations (Lawson, 2016).
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the Separate Administration was the collection of
communal taxes, rendered in-kind in the form of monthly labor or quotas of produce and
organized by the Roko Tui (Macnaught, 2016). Significantly, these laws were coordinated thru a
separate system of courts apart from the colonial government. Colonial police rarely interfered
with iTaukei peoples, and only if they lived in Suva or a larger town (Macnaught, 2016). It
could best be thought of as a literal second government within the Fijian colonial government,
with its own unique laws, courts, and governance structures. In this way, we see the
simplification of iTaukei culture into a monolithic entity, tied to one specific geographic and
hierarchical expression. Fiji itself turns out to be a complex and multifaceted group of islands,
with the unifying term of “Feejee” imposed upon it by Europeans (Parke, 2014). The makeup of
Fiji is diverse, as it is a meeting point in both the Melanesian and Polynesian migration patterns
(Norton, 2012). Thus, there was a wide variety of cultural practices among different islands, and
even differences amongst the main island of Viti Levu itself.
The people of the west living in the mountains of the Ba and Ra regions, and the outer
islands, lived in far more egalitarian communities, with the chiefly position either not existing, or
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being merely a symbolic title (Macnaught, 2016; Norton, 2012; Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002). The
interactions of iTaukei people were much more fluid than the codification of the Separate
Administration would be able to allow. The mataqali had a significant dependence on location,
rather than blood ties (though kinship does still play a role). It was, and still is, common for a
distant relative to make a lateral integration into another family if they move into another village
(Nation, 1978). Indeed, in order to be included in the deliberations of the koro, one must be
formally included into one of the village mataqali. As I will explore later, this presents structural
barriers for any non-iTaukei living in the area to be included in the local decisions—creating a
sort of de facto disenfranchisement.
Though a certain cultural perspective has been enshrined into law, other traditional
customs continue, submerged just below the surface, to emerge when the legal and extra-legal
customs come into conflict. This diversity of cultural expression can be seen in the numerous
dialects of the iTaukei language (Nation, 1978); in fact, these ‘dialects’ are perhaps better
described as different languages altogether, with different sentence structures and different
alphabetical constitution. During my training, I had to learn the Bau dialect that was taken as the
base for iTaukei language during Cession. Yet in going to my service site, I had to learn a
specific dialect of Na Colo (the mountains) common to my region. The language one uses
immediately identifies one as coming from a certain geographical location, be it the mountains or
any of the over 100 habited islands that make up Fiji. Anecdotally, when I give the traditional
greeting of my village—Colo gali—in the cities and towns around Viti Levu, I am immediately
recognized as living in the mountains of Ba. This lingual difference is included with different
customs of respect and, as noted earlier, different relational status to hierarchies. In this lingual
variation we can also see the work of the colonial administration to affect cultural monopoly.
The British, working closely with Ratu Cakabau and the chiefs of the south-eastern islands,
declared that the Bauan dialect should be the lingua franca of the iTaukei people. Bau is the
home island of Ratu Cakabau, and the dialect from this area is still taught as the “Fijian”
language, with other dialects not being allowed to be spoken in schools.

Girmitya

Gordon’s attempts to ‘preserve’ Fijian (iTaukei) culture by creating the Separate
Administration was immediately met with the challenge of making the colony profitable and
satisfying the European settlers’ demands. To walk the line of cultural preservation and profit,
Gordon ordered the import of indentured servants known as Girmit from India (Norton, 2012;
Macnaught, 2016). ‘Girmit’ comes from the Indian understanding of the word ‘agreement’,
which they signed to come to Fiji. So, starting in 1875 and continuing until 1916 the British
brought thousands of Girmitya from India to work sugarcane fields for the British (Macnaught,
2016). The logic of this approach was that the iTaukei population would be kept in their
villages—their culture would not suffer the trauma of being uprooted in order to suit the needs of
sugarcane farming. The Girmitya in turn would satisfy the need for labor in order to make the
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Fijian colony profitable for the Crown (One wonders what the colonizers thought of the culture
of the Indians themselves). Many of the Girmitya stayed in Fiji after the end of their contract,
and their descendants have constituted a non-indigenous group. There have been fluctuations
over the last century, but the population Fiji as of 2007 consists of 54% iTaukei, and 38% IndoFijian (Naidu, 2013). Until 2006 the indigenous population was known simply as Fijians, and the
descendants of the Girmitya as Indians. However, the current Fiji First party government has
declared that the term “Fijian” should include everyone who is born within the nation-state of
Fiji. This has led to the identification of the indigenous population as iTaukei (translating to
“keepers of the land”) and Indo-Fijians, although this has yet to fully integrate into common
language usage.

Manifold Tensions: an Analysis

Let’s examine the various actions of the British in simplifying and institutionalizing the
culture of Fiji, and the forced importation of Indians into Fiji, have created significant tensions
that echo through history and are clearly felt to this day (Naidu, 2013; Lason & Aminzade, 2008;
Lal, 2012, 2006; Fraenkel, 2009). Ethnic tensions have been fairly persistent between the iTaukei
and Indo-Fijian population, and its origins and persistence have many implications. Fiji has had
four coups since its independence from Great Britain, and in each case one of the animating
factors has been iTaukei animosity toward the Indo-Fijian population and the perception that
they are displacing the indigenous population. However, the beginnings of this tension can be
traced back to the inherent disparity between the European capitalist interest in agriculture and
the subsistence farming traditional iTaukei peoples. As Vandana Shiva point out in Earth
Democracy (2016), class inequalities created by capitalist globalization can become masked,
appearing as ethnic conflicts: “As diverse cultures experience a threat to their values, norms, and
practices by globalization, there is a cultural backlash. When the cultural response does not
simultaneously defend economic democracy and create living economies, it takes the form of
negative identities and negative cultures” (p. 105).
The iTaukei could not be mobilized into the capitalist economy without dissolving their
communal way of living, and so the Girmitya were brought in. Put bluntly: “There was… a
contradiction in the colonial society between the European-dominated capitalist economy and a
Fijian social system perpetuated on the basis of subsistence cultivation” (Norton, 2012). Norton
goes on to say that the Indo-Fijian pressure on iTaukei land and its creation of tension between
the two groups can be clarified by pointing out the conflict is implicitly between the capitalist
desires of Britain and the social system of the iTaukei. The Indians were the bulwark put in
between the European and iTaukei peoples, to satisfy the European desire for profit without
eliciting iTaukei hatred of Europeans. “At this stage the 'divide and rule' doctrine became
increasingly important to ensure that the two communities did not inter-mingle to the extent that
either changed the prescribed orientation and position of the other in the wider scheme of
governance for the country” (Appana & Abbott, 2015, p. 95). The Indo-Fijians who stayed in Fiji
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could rarely find land of their own to settle on and farm, and thus resorted to working in cities
and leasing land from the iTaukei population. This resulted in the swift proletarianization of the
Indo-Fijian population, who were unable to escape the cash economy and had to sell their labor
in order to survive—in contrast with the iTaukei people, whose protected status within the
iTaukei Administration stalled the intrusion of the cash economy into villages (Macnaught,
2016; Norton, 2012; Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002).
This tension has created in Fiji an interesting paradigm in relation to indigenous
movements worldwide. In Fiji, the iTaukei are indigenous, and face anxieties of being replaced
by another population. The Deed of Cession is seen by those in power as the original outline of
indigenous rights in Fiji, establishing the promise of “Fijian Paramountcy”, or the idea that the
iTaukei should first and foremost be protected from displacement. This is functionally enshrined
in the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs, which contains the systems of the iTaukei Administration
outlined above as well as the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB), which records the mataqali
lineages, handles leasing and payouts to mataqali, and border disputes as they arise. We can see
in this the creation of what Timothy Macnaught (2016) has called neotraditional culture, or a
culture seen as traditional but based on a mélange of pre- and post-Cession systems.
In addition, the Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) had a political hand in legislative efforts,
vetoing or augmenting bills as they saw fit, and communal voting rolls, which ensured the larger
population of iTaukei would have control over Parliament (Macnaught, 2016; Norton, 2012).
Despite the power codified in the GCC, there is still a vibrant democratic life within the village
and district bose, which allow for a large degree of local autonomy in cultural and developmental
aspects of everyday life, as opposed to the rigid structure of power at the top of the iTaukei
Administration.
These things have ensured preservation of indigenous rights, but have created a de facto
second class of citizens in Fiji, i.e. all of the peoples who aren’t included in the mataqali roles.
This group is well over 45% of the population of Fiji, the overwhelming majority of which are
Indo-Fijians. Being excluded from these roles cuts off access to over 80% of land, monetary
benefits from leasing land, and being included within the local decision-making process of
villages, districts, and provinces that the iTaukei Administration facilitates. The formal
governmental process for redress is not nearly as robust as the systems of the iTaukei
Administration, lacking any inherent institutions of direct democracy such as the bose. We can
see in this brief history of the Fijian Administration the creation of a neotraditional culture,
where colonial boundaries were put on a richly textured and vibrant collection of cultures,
ethnicities and traditions in order to create the concept of the ‘native Fijian’. Further, we can see
how this structure was designed to sit upon the cultural foundation of the Eastern chiefs to serve
as a structure to support both the divide-and-conquer and indirect rule strategies of the British
Empire.
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Development Discourse of Fiji

Here it is worthwhile to look at what the development paradigm of European and chiefly
elites, to see expectations for Fiji have been as well as their desired outcomes. This will allow us
to add another thread the manifold of interpenetration tensions explicated above, in order to
identify their role in the frustration of the nation-state and hindrance of capitalist penetration into
rural Fiji. To begin with, as stated above, the import of Girmitya rendered the iTaukei people and
their culture superfluous to development. The European capitalists were able to make profit
without investing much time or effort into the iTaukei population. In this way, the iTaukei were
left out of the development discourse (Norton, 2012). However, after indentured labor was
outlawed in 1916, the Indo-Fijian population gained an upper hand as workers—cheap labor
could no longer be imported, so the Indo-Fijians had an advantage in negotiating for better
wages. So, in 1920, dissatisfied by stagnating wages and increased prices of commodities, they
went on a massive strike throughout the Suva area. Norton points out that this shattered the
perception of Indo-Fijians as subservient workers and scared the Europeans who relied on their
labor for profit (2012). As the strikes were going on the iTaukei population was initially
sympathetic, lending shelter and supplies to the striking workers, but missionaries and the GCC
(at the behest of their European counterparts) convinced the people to turn against the IndoFijians—helping to break strikes and to cut cane in place of Indo-Fijians (Norton, 2012). This
event proved to be a paradigm shift in the perceptions of Europeans; as Indo-Fijians were
demanding treatment equal to them, they came to see the iTaukei as allies against a potentially
rebellious Indo-Fijian population (Macnaught, 2016). Thus, the iTaukei entered the discourse of
development.
This alliance was cemented further in the 1930s when Indo-Fijians began pressing for
governmental equality with Europeans, including common roll voting. At that time, parliament
had one Indo-Fijian member who was nominated by the Governor, as opposed to six elected
European seats and two iTaukei seats chosen by the GCC (Macnaught, 2016). The Europeans
worked with the iTaukei chiefs to quell this call for equal voting rights, using the Deed of
Cession as a reification of the British role of guarding the iTaukei against Indo-Fijian
encroachment. It is important here to underscore that the chiefs themselves were the totality of
colonial political power for the iTaukei people, and the chiefs sensed a threat in the Indo-Fijian
push for common role voting—if they achieved it, surely the iTaukei people would also want to
vote for their representatives in the colonial government, a terminal threat to the absolute
political power of the chiefs (Norton, 2012).
These instances are examples of the roots of racial tensions between iTaukei and IndoFijian peoples. Typically, they have been enflamed and salient when Indo-Fijians presented a
threat to the hegemony of both European and chiefly control. In this way Indo-Fijians have
become scapegoats for the effects of British colonization, a stigma that exists to this day, and
becomes apparent whenever a coup occurs. This represents another aspect of the intertwined
conflicts: not only is there tension between Eastern chiefly elites and the ‘common’ iTaukei,
there is also tension between the chiefly elite (in collaboration with British government) and
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Indo-Fijians. The iTaukei people for the most part only took part in racial violence at the behest
of the chiefly elite, who used their positions as cultural gatekeepers to cement racial tension for
political ends. This was seen clearly in the lead-ups to both the 1987 and 2000 coups, where
ethnic hatred was enflamed through the rhetoric of ethno-nationalist parties, conspicuously
headed by chiefly elites (Norton, 2012).
It also represents a paradigm shift in the development discourse of the Europeans and
their counterparts in the GCC for the iTaukei people. The 1930s saw a move by them to
encourage iTaukei people to commercially cultivate their own land, rather than leasing it to IndoFijians. At this time there was no pressure to join the waged workforce, as the cash economy had
yet to penetrate the villages and islands throughout Fiji. In 1936 the GCC decreed that land
unused for subsistence farming or living be opened up for development, culminating in the
centralization of leasing rights by the government in 1940 (“The Creation of the TLTD”, 2018).
In this way, the Europeans and chiefly elites hoped to push the ‘reserve labor’ of iTaukei
villagers into production (Norton, 2012; Macnaught, 2016). This also coincided with liberalizing
reforms in the iTaukei Administration in order to make a transition from “Communalism” to
“Individualism” (Norton, 2012; Spate, 1960). John Nation states in Customs of Respect (1978)
that:
Development… is more fundamentally higher income due to greater production
resulting from the increased productivity of more scientific methods of agriculture.
The key to this modern commercial agriculture was thought to be individual
initiative. The Fijian administration was seen, therefore, as not merely expensive
and unnecessary, but actually harmful to economic growth because it hampered
individual initiative (p. 48).

O.H.K. Spate’s commentary on the Burns Report (a development report released in 1960)
stated that communal systems ought to “…disappear as soon as possible. Probably nearly all
detached and informed observers would fully agree that this system and its institutional
expression, the Fijian Administration, are very strong brakes on the advance both of the Fijians
and of Fiji, and should be got rid of…” (Spate, 1960, p. 54). Spate himself had produced a
development report in 1959. According to another study of development commissioned by the
colonial government in 1969, John Nation (1978) makes this point: “There is a temptation to
rank villages or provinces along a scale of ‘development’ according to the degree of penetration
of the cash economy. Watters’ study tends to make this kind of ranking judgement, using the
term ‘westernization’ as an occasional synonym or substitute” (p. 36). The claims in these
reports are that the iTaukei lag behind their Indo-Fijian counterparts in employment, income,
quality of life, and access to basic necessities.
We see over and over again during the period of the early 1900’s to roughly the 1950’s
this conflict between Fijian communal society and the desire for ‘individualism’ masking the
deeper penetration of the capitalist economy. One British official claimed that “salvation… was
for Fijians to become more like 'the sturdy yeomen' of England were romantically understood to
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be: hardworking, individually self-sufficient, thrifty farmers and artisans, loyal to their social
superiors and devoted to their families in the privacy of picturesque, clean little cottages with
separate bedrooms” (Macnaught, 2016, p. 15). We see in this the spinning wheels of teleological
development—that a people must progress from backwardness and chaos into a prim and
superior society—consequently modeled by British capitalists.
Yet how does a system, of which the political power-holders explicitly collaborate with
European colonialists, produce such a strong negative response and push for abolition? The
answer, I would like to posit, is two-fold: the retention of inalienable land rights and the living
culture of everyday lifeways of the iTaukei people. As stated above, they rarely were involved in
the colonial government (the GCC held all the power), and did not have to be involved with the
capitalist economy (as this was populated with Europeans and Indo-Fijian workers). While these
systems where whirring along, the iTaukei kept a subsistence economy supplemented with
money got from land leasing, and practiced a vibrant political life apart from colonial
government structure. To explain this analysis, I rely on the distinction in social ecological
thought between ‘Statecraft’ and ‘Politics’. “A State, by its very nature, is structurally and
professionally separated from the general population—in fact, it is set over and above ordinary
men and women” (Biehl, 2017, p. 1). In The Rise of Urbanization and the Decline of Citizenship
(1987), Bookchin traces the origins of politics and political institutions from early formations in
tribes and clans, through the Athenian polis, and to the current day—and in so doing draws a
distinction between Statecraft and Politics. Statecraft is the current understanding of the political
process, of representative democracy, elections, congressional or parliamentary processes, and
most conspicuously, the threat of violence that undergirds noncompliance with the State.
In contrast to this is Politics, the engagement in a public body by people to decide their
own affairs. Some components of this are its directly democratic aspect, and its scale of face-toface decision making. The critique that SE makes of the current political terrain is that Statecraft
is employed to stifle truly political movements and organization, and as such has acted to
sterilize communal consociation and direct the focus of people from each other onto the
mechanics of the Nation-State. In Bookchin’s words: “Aristocracies, monarchies, and republics
ultimately dissolve the body politic as a participatory entity, and essentially ecological
phenomenon into an amorphous mass of privatized “social” beings we so aptly call an electorate
or a constituency” (1987).
The systems of the State have over centuries colonized the very notion of politics itself,
until the very notion of politics has come to by synonymous with statecraft “In past centuries,
before the emergence of the Nation-State, politics was understood to mean the activity of citizens
in a public body, empowered in shared, indeed participatory institutions. In contrast to the State,
politics, as it once was and as it could be again, is directly democratic” (Biehl, 2017, p. 5).
Though the State has been acting in ways to sterilize these methods of political organization in
Fiji, they have persisted. This is because the State can be thought of, not as an overruling power
in the lives of the people for most of this time, but as a temporary inconvenience. The State and
its officials are concentrated in certain areas, while most people carried on their everyday
lifeways and political processes. This analysis enables us to see that while the GCC was
politically expedient to the British, communal control of land and politics independent of them
was not.
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Indeed, the European capitalists who had settled in Fiji before Cession saw this as an
attack on liberty, and they “despaired of Fijians ever being accorded the full personal liberty of
British subjects, the liberty above all else to sell their lands and become a free-floating pool of
labour” (Macnaught, 2016, p. 8). What we see in this is the roots of a conflict still very much in
play today—one between the profit motive of capitalists and of the collective culture of Fiji.
Macnaught (2016) goes on to explain: “The native taxation scheme was particularly resented by
the European settlers: more than anything else it gave teeth to the government policy of
insulating Fijians from the need to divert their labour resources to the plantations, and to become
wholly dependent on local merchants” (p. 8).
What we see here is a nascent development discourse surrounding the iTaukei people and
their relationship to both land and labor. During this time, there was increasing pressure from
capitalist penetration to make the colony profitable in the wake of the end of indentured
servitude and the demand of Indo-Fijians for both wages and representation equal to that of their
European counterparts. This would mean stifling the communal way of life still very much
entrenched in Fiji. Macnaught (2016) encapsulates this progression quite well, saying:
Whenever possible Fijians were trying to subvert, so to speak, the economic
goals of the colony by subsuming them into more congenial and traditional ways
of meeting their needs. Whereas in the nineteenth century the government
valued the stability this state of affairs gave to the colony and recognized the
satisfactions of Fijian social life as good in themselves, in the twentieth century
the proponents of more material progress were to become impatient with a
society that showed such disrespect for individual profit (p. 26).
We can see the origins of the discourse of development in Fiji as a method of exerting power and
control over both Indo-Fijian and iTaukei populations by European settlers and chiefly elites
embodied in the GCC. This is not something that went unnoticed by the iTaukei themselves, who
began to chafe under the Great Chiefs when they stopped the reciprocal nature of the traditional
chief-commoner relationship: “…it concerned Fijians… when they did not take place with the
customary sense of proportion and reciprocity, or when the Bauan [Eastern] chiefs (the main
culprits) and others failed in their return obligations” (Macnaught, 2016, p. 40). This gives us a
glimpse at the mutable nature of the chief-commoner relationship, where power and status were
imbued by the people into a chief as their representative, and the chief was expected to
reciprocate through magnanimity and support. When this relationship began to break down,
conflict between the upper and lower strata of iTaukei society intensified.
It is important then, to look at the results of this policy of liberalization on the iTaukei
and Indo-Fijian peoples. Put succinctly, the iTaukei were directed to farm the land for
themselves, and stopped leasing land to Indo-Fijians; which caused mass unrest with the latter
population. To the dismay of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company (CSR) though, the iTaukei
were less industrious in the production of sugarcane, leaving the company with less product than
they had with Indo-Fijian workers. One British official in charge of supervising iTaukei planters
gave instructions on how to plant sugarcane, then left to attend to other business. When he came
back he found: “The men had already gone home. To his disgust he found that the cane tops had
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been thrown anywhere into the furrows, uncut, and with a foot or two exposed to the scorching
sun” (Macnaught, 2016, p. 24).
In addition, there was rising sentiment amongst the iTaukei that they could cut out
Europeans from the land leasing arrangement (Norton, 2012). Within this milieu, the iTaukei and
Indo-Fijians in parliament and in factories began collaborating, seeing common ground between
themselves against the white colonialists, with Indo-Fijians and iTaukei collaborating on leasing
and labor without consulting the colonial government. The response by a prominent chief and
member of the GCC Ratu Lala Sukunato was to centralize control of the land in the Native Land
Trust Board (NLTB), later renamed the iTaukei Land Trust Board (TLTB) in 1940, and to
reorganize the iTaukei Administration (“The Creation of the TLTB”, 2018). The centralization
of land leasing, done ostensibly to rationalize land leasing practices, had the effect of taking land
issues out of the hands of the mataqais and placing it in the hand of a newly reorganized and
bureaucratized iTaukei Administration, working closely with the British colonial government.
This is a reversal of the move toward ‘individualization’ pushed in 1930s, and the chiefly elite,
which had been losing influence over the iTaukei people, were more firmly tied into the
bureaucracy of the iTaukei Administration. Appana & Abbott (2015) state that: “This acceptance,
of the centrality of chiefs, by the colonial administration was in no small measure due to pressure
and support from 'hard-pressed European mercantile capitalists.'” (p. 96). In this way, the chiefs
of Fiji were cemented as the dual actors of holding authority over the vanua and the wielders of
political bureaucratic authority (Norton, 2012; Macnaught, 2016).
This shift in the 1940s and beyond accompanied a conscious reversal of the previous
move toward individualism, and the village was taken to be the ideal site for economic growth
(as opposed to the commercial production encouraged through the 1930s). As time went on,
there began to be more and more of a separation between the chiefly elites and the commoners, a
tension which had been forcibly snuffed out with the reversal of ‘individualist’ development in
the 1940s and the investiture of the chiefs with much more extensive bureaucratic power.
However, this conflict has been building again since then: “Commoner assertions of individual
rights and aspirations are clearly being pitted against chiefly authority with greater regularity.
This is closely linked to an ever-widening rural-urban divide that continues to shrink the domain
of the chief.” (Appana & Abbott, 2016, p. 104). This is an instructive example of the tension that
exists between traditional lifeways and the push for development. It is important to see the actors
in this tension, and to be able to identify who is benefitting from these pushes. “A function of
these institutions”, as Norton points out, “was to support the dominant capitalist enterprise by
facilitating its access to land for use by Indian farmers” (2012). In this way, we can see the
discourse of development in Fiji has been in an effort to solve the contradiction of the communal
society of the iTaukei with the need to sustain a parallel capitalist economy.
According to research in 2003 on inequality in Fiji, Sriskandarajah lays out the political
motivation and vacuous rhetoric of inter-ethnic economic inequality. In this report they lay out
data collected to show income statistics from 1977 through the mid-90s, which shows a
relatively equal incomes from the middle of both iTaukei and Indo-Fijian populations
(Sriskandarajah, 2003, p. 316). The political implications are clear: “Importantly, perceptions
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about inequality are often coupled with a feeling of vulnerability among both major groups…
These perceptions, and the grievances they generate in both groups, create the possibility of
‘inter-communal malaise (Premdas, 1993) and pave the way for political entrepreneurs to exploit
grievances to their own advantage” (Sriskandarajah, 2003, p. 317). Interestingly, the report
points out that since the 1970s intra-ethnic income inequality has grown significantly, and the
highest income group consist of Chinese and European descended people. Yet despite this, the
British colonialists and then political/chiefly elite iTaukei have used economic inequality as a
wedge issue to inflame racial tensions—with many of the ethno-centric political parties
implementing ‘development projects’ at the expense of non-iTaukei populations (Sriskandarajah,
2003). Stated by the report: “Redistributing income along ethnic lines is unlikely to be effective
in achieving equality in Fiji” (Sriskandarajah, 2003, p. 320). This report on income should also
carry with it an understanding that income is but one factor in understanding equality, and that
the non-commodified advantages of rural iTaukei villages (access to land, food, water, & shelter
free of cost) is left unremarked upon.
As part of my service, and in concert with my research for this paper, I have tried to
unbury the assumptions and expectations for my being placed here in this village. When Peace
Corps staff does consultations with potential service sites, they discuss with the community what
development is and the potentials of having a Peace Corps Volunteer. What I have found,
through my own experience and in discussions with other PCVs, is that oftentimes our
communities see themselves as passive objects of development—asking “what will you do for
us?” or “will you help make us more civilized?” These questions are disturbing to me, and I have
worked to discuss with the community that they have the potential and ability to direct their own
development, and that I would be happy to serve and support, but wouldn’t tell them what must
be done. We made a development plan together, with me holding meetings with the various
councils and age groups to get a sense of what kinds of projects and needs the community saw
for itself. Then, in the monthly bose, I held an information session and instant-runoff ballot
voting to decide the order of projects/issues. From this a list was created and given to the turaga
ni koro for safekeeping and use.
A more ephemeral part of my service has been to discuss the differences between the US
and Fiji in terms of land and culture. I have worked to invert the perception of the US society as
a pinnacle to be achieved, and emphasized the deleterious effects of capitalism and land
alienation. This is especially effective in relating my experience in a small ‘village’ in the US,
and the many differences around and between people. I also seek to answer candidly questions of
US militarism and imperialism, especially regarding our invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan. Fiji
has a military whose main actions are serving in UN Peacekeeping forces in the Golan Heights,
so there is some interest in the area. I have also tried to make explicit the potentials and pitfalls
of capitalist penetration into the countryside, discussing land issues and how losing control of
land to corporations destroys ways of living. While I am not allowed to make overt political
statements regarding the Fijian nation-state, most of the people I discuss this with bring up the
Fiji Pine Corporation and the Vatukoula gold mine, both of which operate in the area and both
have leased large amounts of land for industrial/agro-industrial development.
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The Gradient of Democracy

Within the liberal developmental discourse, the capitalist economy is discussed in terms
of promoting ‘individualism’ and the ‘liberalization’ of Fijian society. As we will see, this
tension has been a major factor in the instability of the post-colonial Fijian nation-state. It has
also—not by accident—been tied together with the racial tensions that have also been a large
factor. Along with development and liberalization must come democracy, and that the structure
of the iTaukei Administration hinders representative democracy. In recent development
discourse, the concept of ‘participatory development’ has become popular (Kindon, 2009). The
participatory approach calls for the inclusion of the various stakeholders in the subject of
development—be it new farming techniques, construction, or new education methods. While this
is useful in many respects, it also presents a problem of re-creating power dynamics between
North and South participants (Kindon, 2009).
As Farrelly (2011) ably shows in her study of the Bouma area of Fiji, implementation of
participatory, democratic processes does not necessarily lead to political empowerment, and
indeed can lead to difficulties in stakeholder led development. The study conducted follows the
development of an eco-tourist park in the north of Fiji, on Taveuni. As part of the development
of this tourist site, a method of participatory decision making was introduced in an effort to make
the development more egalitarian. Yet, after a few years of the site being up and running, there
were threats from some community members to burn the resort down, and one turaga ni koro
had been murdered over disputes about said resort.
In investigating, it was discovered that the participatory processes were implemented
from the top-down, and ignored the indigenous processes that were already in place (Farrelly,
2011). An important factor that resulted from this oversight was the split of the decision-making
processes into component parts—one process for the management and administration of the
resort, and one for local political issues. This is a standard Western method of management, but
is foreign to the iTaukei people. For the iTaukei, the concepts of land, community, economy and
prosperity are all corded together in one expression—vanua. Literally translated, it means “land”
or countryside, but the implication is that the land, spirits, and the people are tied together, as is
their prosperity. It is the unification of social, political, and economic interests.
As may have become clear, the management of an eco-resort is much more than a
business venture, but indeed the management of the prosperity of the people themselves. Thus, it
cannot be reasonably separated out by western style of decision-making. Quoted from Farrelly,
(2011):
The majority of the Bouma community make every effort to live their lives va’avanua or
“the vanua way”. Living life va’avanua requires that an individual encourages and
maintains social harmony and social solidarity. There is no direct translation of “success”
in the Boum¯a dialect. Indigenous Fijians may refer instead to sautu as an ideal goal.
Nabobo-Baba (2007) describes sautu as “good health and wealth” in which good health is
explained in terms of physical, emotional, psychological and spiritual wellbeing and
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wealth is “an abundance of material resources … but more importantly … a wide and
healthy network of relationships” (Nabobo-Baba, 2006, p. 74).
This point about participatory decision-making development is not to denigrate it as such, but to
point out that within a specific context, certain methods of participation and democracy are
incompatible with the methods of indigenous peoples. In some ways, says Kindon: “participation
operates as a new form of tyranny subjecting people to particular disciplinary forces- facilitation,
participatory and visual methods and group analysis in public spaces - often reproducing the very
power relations it was supposed to subvert” (2009, p. 526). The resort in Bouma is still
struggling to resolve the contradiction of fast-paced Western conceptions of bureaucratic
decision making and slower paced, consensus based decision making. This is also to show that
within the discourse of development in general, and participatory approaches in particular, there
can be an inherent paternalism of ‘democracy’ in its western conception. Another point to
consider is the tension in miniature between the paradigm of economic development through
‘participation’ in the capitalist economy and the paradigm of living va’avanua.
In Fiji, this direct democracy is embedded both in system of the iTaukei Administration
though the bose va koro and the cultural practice of talanoa (story telling). Talanoa sessions are
essentially informal spaces where people will talk, usually in a circle and involve the drinking of
kava. This forum is a method of decision-making and consensus building, as well as for
disseminating information. Farrelly also points out that: “…formal talanoa in village meetings
provides “the opportunity for ‘slow thinkers’ to be engaged in the discussions .... [T]he
philosophy of talanoa is centred on an open-style of deliberation, focusing on respect, tolerance,
flexibility, openness and fairness” (Robinson & Robinson, 2005, as cited in Farrelly 2011, p.
827). In a talanoa people combine chatting about their day and gossiping with any business or
larger decisions that ought to be made. This can make the sessions extend for hours as people
show up, chat, drink kava, and weave any proper business throughout. This can be seen as
inefficient from a western development perspective, preferring a professionalized style of
decision making. In addition, it in many places can have elements of hierarchy within it, as with
privileging elders over youth, or men over women.
In her work on indigenous direct democracy, Eleanor Finely points out that such
democracies are incompatible with market-driven social relations (2016). She lays out the
structure of three indigenous systems of direct democracy in the Americas, and their employment
as a form of resistance to globalized capitalist and state intrusion. In Fiji however, the indigenous
decision-making process is institutionalized first within the colonial governance, and then in the
state apparatus. This has led to some complications and contradictions within Fiji; as outlined
above, political and cultural power have been invested in the chiefs, who have become a hybrid
of state and traditional power. Yet, in the local context of the village, the people gather in
talanoa sessions to elect their own village headman (or woman, though this is far less common),
and typically a village meets monthly to review the workings of the village, make decisions, and
organize and employ resources.
Usually, a bose va koro consists of the various councils giving reports to the village at
large, concerns are brought to light, and plans of action are made. The councils can change from
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village to village, but broadly speaking there are councils for women, youth, crime and
mediation, finance, health, religion, elder care, and cultural preservation. If the village looks to
do a project and needs funds, they perform a soli (fundraiser) to pool resources, or give it to
support families in need. So, while the upper strata of the iTaukei Administration is tied to a
chiefly power elite, the grassroots consists of a directly democratic form, with an emphasis on
the harmony of the vanua. These village councils operate mostly autonomously, since there is no
official governmental oversight or enforcement, especially in the islands and remote portions of
Fiji.
In the monthly bose in the community I live in people will show up early to talanoa,
smoke cigarettes, drink kava and joke before transitioning into the meeting, where discussion is a
bit more structured and kava is drunk in a ritual manner. During this time, the various councils
debrief and discuss both the previous month and plans going forward. Recently, a decision was
reached to charge each household $2 (FJD) a month for the use of piped water, in order to help
fund the maintenance of piping and to afford a cover for the dam (which is currently open and
has become a sanitation issue). Village meetings, bylaws, and existence of councils changes from
place to place for numerous reasons, which results in a gradient of democracy. Some of the
bylaws restrict women from participating in the meetings (one turaga ni koro took time in a
meeting to admonish the women present for speaking too much), some have inactive councils,
meetings can be held infrequently, and in some cases the bose va koro has broken down
completely.
It seems that in villages that are close to towns and cities, population can balloon quickly
as the urban sprawl grows, causing a breakdown of the ability to have face-to-face meetings.
Some villages hold bose based on clan ties, as opposed to geographical ties, leading to several
meetings taking place in a single village. This is in addition to well documented issues of graft
and lack of accountability in the provincial councils (Rotuivaqali, 2012). Yet, as Bookchin
discusses in his work on dialectical naturalism, it is important to look at the lived reality of
cultures—the forms of freedom as well as the legacy of domination—and to recognize that
unfulfilled potential does not negate potentiality as such (2005; 2017). The fact that some of
these meetings and councils partake in forms of oppression and domination does not mean that
they do not have a potential to become organs of non-oppressive direct democracy.
It must be remarked upon that nearly all the literature discussing Fijian development,
nation-state, economics and constitution I have come across frame the need for democracy as a
State issue. They discuss the need for democracy as a necessary step to support the development
of market capitalism in Fiji, and repeatedly mention that the iTaukei culture must ‘change with
the times’ to accommodate the new economy. Yash Ghai (2017), in his analysis of the most
recent constitution, states that: “Fiji is caught up in a culture that is based on the organisation of
an outdated economy” (p. 197). In a social ecological analysis, this configuration is almost
directly backwards—a state reduces the experience of democracy and cultural vibrancy. We see
this borne out in the establishment of the iTaukei Administration itself, as it was a reduction of
culture and an implementation of state methods of control, like the GCC. Yet as things filter
down, we find a fecund operation of grassroots democracy. In these reports, many of them
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claiming to be objective, we see unburied the ideology of Capital and State, appropriating
democracy and economic ‘development’ for themselves and reducing Fijians to objects of
development. We will look at a case study of this below, but the impact and vibrancy of
everyday directly democratic lifeways in Fiji warrants much further study and support.
As hopefully has become clear from earlier analyses, the iTaukei Administration is a
complex system, weaving together traditional, neo-traditional, colonialist, communalist and
individualist strands that have caused a lot of conflict and different parts become salient as
different avenues for development are constructed. We can see the local direct democracy
gradate into hierarchical structures, foremost of which is the Great Council of Chiefs. This
sensitive analysis must be kept in mind as we discuss the potentials and effects of the iTaukei
Administration in relation to ethnic conflict, state weakness, democracy and the liberal nationstate.

Urbanization Against Citizenship in Fiji

In looking at the development of capitalist penetration into Fiji, we can use towns and
cities as a useful weathervane. The concept of a city as the potential site for the formation of
inter-ethnic citizenship is one closely held in social ecology. Parallel to this is a critique of the
devolution of cities into a sprawling, shapeless urban mass. In Fiji, this can be examine through
the bloated growth of cities—Suva, Lautoka, Labasa, and their satellite towns. As of 2017, the
total number of people living in cities is 55.9% (FBoS, 2018). Typically, there are two ways
Fijians interact in the flux between urban and rural. For the iTaukei people, cities serve as a site
for income generation as well as finding a spouse. Money earned in the city is brought back to
the village and family, and often an iTaukei person will work until they have enough money to
achieve a project (building a new house or business) or to live off for a few months, and come
back to the village. In this way the village serves as the anchor, and people will go into a city to
siphon out funds from the city. One major exception to this are those who hold civil service or
educational positions—they make up the portion of the city that can be called a suburb. The
experience of Indo-Fijians, Rotuman, and other structurally landless communities experience city
life in much the same manner as we would find familiar in the US, renting apartments or living
in government provided housing and working continuously to afford their daily, monthly, and
yearly expenses.
The massive growth of urbanization is evidenced in the large ‘squatter towns’ that have
sprung up mainly around the cities of Suva and Labasa. These areas are sprawling and
ramshackle towns built of cheap and discarded materials to form crude houses, and as of 2006
represented anywhere from 16%-24% of urban housing in Fiji (UNICEF, 2007). People living in
these areas look for work, but are living in a liminal space between governance structures—there
is no municipal, traditional, or national institutions that can coordinate these squatter settlements,
resulting in tenuous and unsafe conditions for the residents. Those that come to these squatter
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towns largely do not have the benefit of familial or traditional networks, and are proletarianized
through being subjected to waged labor and unsanitary housing conditions.
The city factors prominently in social ecological theory as a site to help bring together
people, historically breaking the blood-tie of tribal bands and serving as the loam from which a
common notion of citizenship can blossom. The city then becomes a site for a conscious creation
of culture and society, allowing for a fecund exchange of ideas, practices and exchange. It also
served as a site of resistance for nascent and developing States. According to Bookchin (1987):
“Confederations…were the principal political weapons for resisting—and, for a
time, diminishing—state power. The struggles for confederated Rhenish cities in
the late Middle Ages against the Holy Roman Empire and of the confederated
Spanish cities against Charles V during the Reformation era can be cited as
partially successful attempts to abort or restrict imperial and national power” (p.
xx).
Yet, as capitalism has molded the city into instruments of capital accumulation, there has
been a corresponding destruction of the city itself and the rise of the urban sprawl. This
includes the destruction of public spaces in favor of commercial spaces, and the
penetration of state control mechanisms that supplanted the more common municipally
confederated structure that rivaled the nation-state.
In addition, the devolution of social life from the homogenizing effects of capital
and hierarchy radiate out from the urban sprawl to consume the rural life as well
(Bookchin, 1987). Where in the past there was a relationship between the city and
countryside that could be both in conflict and in tension, the trend of formless
urbanization has supplanted both city and country into itself. In looking at the squatter
towns, we see this being played out. As globalized capital penetrates into Fiji, it causes
people to become decoupled from their cultural, social, and political contexts and become
free-floating labor. This is a desideratum of globalized capitalist markets—in the Global
South this process is named “development”.
It represents a breakdown of any kind of coherent forms of governance, as the
State seeks to impose its will upon these areas and any face-to-face direct democracy
becomes unwieldy. This is true in the villages surrounding towns as well, as they grow in
size the bose begins to break down. However, as stated above there is still a relationship
between city and country that exist together for the iTaukei villages. Rural areas are
statistically poorer than those living in the city, and as such most of the development
efforts have been focused on this area, and specifically the iTaukei people. While this is
discussed elsewhere, it is important to note that most of the people who live in rural areas
have the means of traditional lifeways available to them, which do not register on many
development reports, whose focus is on income, GDP, and production.
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State Failure in Fiji
Holding the tension between communal lifeways and the capitalist economy in mind
(along with the inter- and intra-ethnic tensions that augment and give vent to it), let’s examine
the literature around the post-colonial nation-state of Fiji. This will allow us to pinpoint the role
of the iTaukei Administration amongst the manifold of interpenetrating conflicts. In order to do
so, we must take a brief survey of the four coups that have occurred in Fiji which have brought
many scholars of state instability and have earned Fiji the nickname ‘coup coup land’. After, I
will examine the literature about the causes of state weakness in Fiji, specifically focusing on the
work of Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, current (as of 2019) Attorney General (AG) in the Fiji First
government. While at first it looks to be state weakness, parochialism, and under-development
caused by maintaining a system of cultural autonomy, there turns out to be a swirl of
interpenetrating causes. Tensions between a heterogeneous ‘iTaukei’ people (Eastern Chiefly
elite versus a less hierarchical West); between iTaukei chiefs as holders of both power and
culture and ‘commoners’; between the iTaukei and other ethnicities (most notably the IndoFijians); and between the communal culture of the iTaukei with the individualism and
homogeneity demanded by a liberal capitalist nation-state. These tensions have erupted into open
conflict and resulted in four coups during Fiji’s post-colonial statehood.
Fiji became an independent nation-state in 1970. Under the newly formed government,
one party held sway for over a decade. The Alliance, headed by the Fijian National Party (FNP)
was led by a prominent chief, Ratu Kamisese Mara, and was the party mostly composed of
iTaukei and had the support of the chiefly elite, many of whom were active politically with the
party, either explicitly or through the GCC. The Alliance billed itself as the party of iTaukei
paramountcy and the preservation of chiefly rights (Lawson, 2016). In 1987, the Alliance party
was unseated by a multi-ethnic coalition headed by Fiji Labour Party (FLP). The election was
fraught, with Labour campaigning on economic and welfare issues, ending corruption, and
lowering unemployment. The Alliance party framed the election as a potential attack on iTaukei
culture—after all, the Alliance Party was headed by a powerful chief, and many of the officials
accused of corruption were themselves chiefs (Norton, 2012). One must look at the rhetoric
before the election, with the Alliance framing the election in terms of iTaukei custom versus
foreign invasion—indeed one chief claimed that “without a chief there is no Fijian society”
(Lawson, 2016, p. 59).
The Labour leader, Timoci Bavadra, pointed out that an abuse of chiefly power, and a
bias of eastern chiefs in positions of power, had left the west of Fiji under-developed. Labour
won with large support from the Indo-Fijian population, and a record high (though still small by
comparison) amount of support from the iTaukei population—mostly from western Fiji. This
shows the emerging unity of cultures through trade unionism and shared economic interests
(Lawson, 2016). Under the 1970 constitution, there were communal role voting for election
which favored iTaukei delegates, which meant that no matter the outcomes the racial makeup of
parliament would remain the same (Norton, 2012). This is important to understand in the context
of the backlash of the election, when opponents accused Indo-Fijians of taking over the
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government, with the intention of curtailing iTaukei paramountcy. This was far from the truth,
yet the government in 1987 was overthrown by Colonel Sitiveni Rabuka on the grounds that he
was protecting the indigenous peoples of Fiji, and their revered chiefs (Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002).
Yash Ghai (2017) points out in his analysis that this coup in actuality marked the zenith of
chiefly power. While the losing Alliance leaders claimed they had no known of the coup
conspiracy, Lawson (2016) claims that there is little doubt that they had knowledge of these
plans.
As the interim government began the process of crafting a new constitution, Rabuka
expressed dissatisfaction with the direction they were heading, and again overthrew the
provisional government in September of that same year. The construction of the new constitution
continued to enshrine communal voting, reserving specific spots in the legislature based on race,
with a majority going to the iTaukei, and the GCC was allowed control over certain legislation
perceived to effect indigenous cultural matters (Ghai, 2017). The party sponsored by the GCC,
called the Soqosoqo Vakavulewa n iTaukei (SVT) and headed by Rabuka was elected to power
(Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002). As far as development goes, special programs were created for the
economic, social, educational and cultural advancement of the iTaukei people (specifically in
rural areas), to the exclusion of Indo-Fijians. In addition, indigenous institutions like the TLTB
was given more autonomy (Ghai, 2017). Yet the iTaukei people were split, says Lawson (2016):
Despite, or perhaps because of, guaranteed political predominance, disunity
continued to characterise intra-indigenous Fijian politics. This disunity together
with continuing international opprobrium surrounding a constitution that
discriminated so deeply against a population on the grounds of race were no doubt
factors that influenced a rethink of political arrangements (p. 62).
The resulting review produced a new constitution in 1997, opening up more seats in the
legislature to common role voting and a (slight) reduction in the power of the GCC—it could
nominate fewer legislators, but still retained the right to appoint the President and Vice-President
(Ghai, 2017; Lawson, 2016). Under this new constition, the SVT lost the elections of 1999
(Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002).
The FLP won again, elected with Mahendra Chaundry as the first Indo-Fijian to become
Prime Minister. This perceived assault on indigenous rights (though again, the GCC and
indigenous rights were still firmly entrenched in the constitution) eventually saw George Speight
and fellow conspirators take government members hostage in 2000 (Lawson, 2016). This was
again done in the name of preserving “Fijian Paramountcy”. Yet this coup split the GCC—even
though they had overseen and approved of the 1997, they were riven with political rivalries and
ethno-nationalism, and were unable to respond (Lawson, 2016). The military instituted an
interim government, and when the 1997 constitution was reinstated and new elections were
called the leader of this interim government, Laisenia Qarase, was elected using the same
nationalist rhetoric espoused by Speight himself (Lawson, 2003; 2016). As part of this violent recentering of the iTaukei Qarase introduced the succinctly titled “Blueprint for the protection of
Fijian and Rotuman rights and interests, and the advancement of their development”—a twenty
year development plan to give iTaukei and Rotuman control of half the economy by 2020
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(Sriskandarajah, 2003). A further report by Vijay Naidu (2013) examined this development plan,
with debt forgiveness to iTaukei business, preferential taxi licensing to iTaukei applicants, and
extra money to iTaukei Schools, ended up funneling money to upper-class and politically
connected iTaukei, and left impoverished communities unchanged (p. 13-15)
In 2006 Voreqe Bainimarama overthrew Qarase and his government in the name of anticorruption and ‘good governance’. He famously declared it a “coup to end the coup culture”.
This overthrow, unlike the others, had support from Indo-Fijians, as Bainimarama’s rhetoric
promised an end to communal voting and a racialized government. This coup was indeed a
reversal, perpetrated by a non-chiefly iTaukei against the chiefs and their party and expressing a
desire to end racist governance in Fiji. The GCC earned his ire when they would not support his
coup (as they had done with Rabuka and partially with Speight), and in 2007 he suspended the
council by fiat. Bainimarama and Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum then led a military regime from 20062014, suspending courts and legislation while ruling by decree (Ghali, 2017). During this time
speech was severely restricted, and there were reports of torture by military and police during
this time (“Beating Justice”, 2016) as well as “suppression of basic human rights and
increasingly vindictive administration” (Ghai, 2017, p. 194). The 2014 election saw the official
election of Bainimarama and his Fiji First party. The election was deemed free and fair, but both
Lawson (2016) and Ghai (2017) attribute its overwhelming success to the regimes suppression of
association and the media, combined with rural development projects (road and bridge
construction, as well as water piping) it had been implementing since 2006.
The Bainimarama government should not be construed as one built on the wellbeing of
the people though. More accurately, it can be said to be the neoliberal state coming to fruition
through the attempted stifling of not only ethnic autonomy, but of trade unions as well. Since my
coming to Fiji in 2017, there has been one major strike of airline workers, as well as several
smaller strikes. In each one, Bainimarama has made statements against the trade unions, saying
they are harming national unity and causing divisions in society. This seems to be a recurrence of
ethnic rhetoric brought to the scale of the nation-state. As with much of the ethno-nationalist
rhetoric before this, it also serves to mask the interest of capital, and framing any threat to capital
as a threat to ethnic or national identity. As Arturo Escobar (2012) has stated: “scratch at a
management scheme, and you’ll find a power and cultural struggle, even if couched in terms of
rational action” (p. xvi).
It is hard to miss the entwined notions of race and class here, embodied in a multiracial
party pushing for economic changes and an end to corruption, and a party headed by mostly
eastern chiefly political elites. This is a drama that seems to repeat itself through the history of
Fiji, something of an eternal recurrence. What is the way out? The logic of the system seems to
imply that a disassembly of the iTaukei Administration is necessary for the equality of IndoFijian and iTaukei peoples—to ensure the stability of the liberal nation-state. However, what this
logic fails to grapple with is the necessity of the liberal nation-state itself, and its attendant
economic model—capitalism. As has been outlined above, there is an inherent tension in the
vanua lifeways of the iTaukei people and the pull of profit in a capitalist economy. This is
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necessity of preserving the liberal nation-state through a reduction of cultural autonomy will be
explored later.
For example, "communally held property rights constitute, by virtue of their continuing
existence, a form of anti-capitalist resistance.” (Fenelon and Hall 2004, 162, as cited from
Finley, 2016, p. 7). It is interesting to look at this in the context of Fiji, where communal
property rights are encoded within the government. This is another frame to look at the
instability within the nation-state itself. The nation-state is constituted as a support of the
capitalist economy (Öcalan, 2017; Bookchin, 2005; Karatani, 2014), and thus having a form of
anti-capitalism within the nation-state itself would contribute to a systemic fissure and weakness.
In this way, conflict tends to arise when either of these entities experience a seismic shift. This
contradiction was attempted to be squashed in the 2006 coup in what Bainimarama called “the
coup to end the coup culture”. The result of this was to disband the GCC, suspend the village
bylaws, and to focus on the “economic development” of the iTaukei people. As has been shown
above, this discourse of economic development is a disguise for the institution of neoliberal
economic reforms. It is not insignificant that one of the motivating factors for the coup was a bill
that would revert monetary control of coastlines back to mataqali control instead of private
control (Lal, 2012).
The current development paradigm laid out by the Fiji First party is shifting increasingly
to focus on the economic development of the iTaukei people. There have been a number of
governmental policies directly aimed at this group of people, under the justification that they are
lagging behind economically to the Indo-Fijian population (Naidu, 2013). This indeed is the
current focus of the Peace Corps in Fiji. Our mission framework is Community and Youth
Empowerment, and an overwhelming majority of the Peace Corps Volunteers work in rural
iTaukei villages, teaching at schools and participating in community development and projects
related to healthy living. Indeed, the current Attorney General, Aiyaz Sayed-Khaiyum, wrote a
Master’s thesis on the need to create space for the iTaukei people to develop economically.
The major obstacle that stands in the way of this progress, says Sayed-Khaiyum, is the
cultural autonomy institutionalized in the iTaukei Administration (2002). In his work, he states
that in order to have a functioning nation-state, any type of cultural autonomy that diverts
support and allegiance from the state itself must be eliminated, or there will be a constant
conflict among the people and a weakness of the state:
If groups (and individuals within those groups) recognised as homogenised entities
pledge their ‘first’ loyalty to their own institutions of autonomy rather than to the
official nation-state or the centre then it is an enormous paradigmatic shift from the
classical Liberal view of citizen-state relationship. This shift could in all likelihood
weaken the very foundation of the Liberal nation-state. The asymmetrical
relationships not only transmute ‘notions of the organisation of the state, the
rationalisation of public power and homogenising mission of the state but it has
ramifications on citizenship, loyalty, identity and nationhood (Sayed-Khaiyum,
2002, p. 6)
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Let us explore this claim in further detail, its premises and conclusions. As stated above,
there is significant evidence that the state weakness can be traced to an ethnic division between
Indo-Fijians and iTaukei peoples. However, peeling this premise apart revealed a manifold of
intertwined causes, which must be analyzed in order to see another path. To lay this out
explicitly, we have examined that racially motivated attacks are not uncommon in Fiji, especially
in the coups. However, as Norton (2012) pointed out, these attacks are relatively restrained in
comparison to other ethnic tensions around the world, lacking popular support outside of urban
areas. This is not to make them seem insignificant, but merely to point out the corresponding
level of co-existence that iTaukei and Indo-Fijian peoples experience as part of their day-to-day,
lived experience. Quoted from Norton’s Race and Politics in Fiji:
The conjunction of economic inequalities with pronounced cultural and social
divisions contains the potential for catastrophic conflict. Yet Fiji presents us with
something of a paradox on the spectrum of so-called “plural societies”. Perhaps
more than most of them it contains the conditions one might expect to produce
violent struggle. But the most significant feature of ethnic conflict has been
constraint, not acrimony and confrontation. What is most notable about Fiji is not
the potential for catastrophic conflict but the countervailing social and political
processes that have encouraged accommodation. These processes show the reality
of a society transcending the ethnic division (Loc. 150).

This is contra other incidents of coups within the context of ethnic conflict, where violence
wracks the country in both urban and rural areas. Norton (2012) goes on to explain that in the
coup of 1987, the ethno-nationalist movement failed to develop outside of spheres of political
leaders. Another layer to explore is the economic tensions of the capitalist economy penetrating
into the communal spaces of the iTaukei, and how this can be masked as an output of ethnic
intrusion, sometimes from Europeans, but mainly from Indo-Fijians. On top of this is the
implication of how racially motivated grievances are spread and maintained by a chiefly elite,
who are the gatekeepers of both cultural and state-political power. We can then add to this the
reality that iTaukei culture is not monolithic, and indeed the established chiefly elite are mostly
from eastern Fiji, who have a particular cultural outlook, which has stoked resentment from the
iTaukei peoples of the West (Macnaught, 2016).
Sayed-Khaiyum (2002) has pointed out that the cultural autonomy enshrined in the
iTaukei Administration is an ossified version of culture, keeping it stuck in a conservative model,
as opposed to a living cultural model. This is supported by the work of various historians and
anthropologists, as pointed out by theorists like Vandana Shiva in her discussion of “Living
Cultures” (2016), or Wolfgang Sachs in his discussion of “Fortress Thinking” (Acosta et al,
2019). Shiva notes that: “Living cultures are based on cultural diversity and recognizes our
universal and common humanity” (p. 97), whereas negative or exclusive cultures consider
diversity and pluralism to be weaknesses to be eliminated. Sachs discusses the same phenomena
in the introduction to Pluriverse: A Post-Development Dictionary (2019), describing fortress
thinking as a neo-nationalism that seeks to revive a golden past of an imagined community. In
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order to retain its integrity, its leaders want to all themselves off from other cultures and
ethnicities, as well as the globalized market.
These premises are solid, and well supported, but the conclusion Sayed-Khaiyum comes
to is disputable. His conclusion is that cultural autonomy itself must have a sunset clause, to
ensure the unity of the nation-state, and to allow for the development of the iTaukei peoples and
to bring them into the globalized world. We have explored the discursive nature of development
by European and then iTaukei elites in Fiji—usually a cover for allowing the penetration of the
capitalist economy into the country, which has been tried through various time periods, and has
resulted in cultural upheaval and is typically reversed as the iTaukei peoples do indeed start
entering the ranks of wage earners and agricultural production.
When this is done, it is done in a way that itself subverts the state—as exemplified by the
iTaukei people being pushed to participate in industrial agricultural production. In so doing, they
stopped renting to their Indo-Fijian counterparts, but to the dismay of the colonially owned CSR,
there was no economic pressure on the iTaukei to produce their required quota (Macnaught,
2016; Norton, 2012). And because the Indo-Fijians had no land to farm, there was no one else to
go to. This alarmed the colonial state, as it struck a blow to the most important aspect of their
rule—the bottom line. The decision was reversed when the Europeans realized the iTaukei
people were moving toward shutting them out of the profit. These can be looked at as the
creation of negative cultures described by Shiva (2016), where exclusion and disparity destroy
identity and culture. This negative culture sees exclusion as a key feature of a revitalized culture
in the face of homogenization through globalized economics, most often accomplished thru
violence. We have also looked at the problems of development in a general context, along with
its attendant critique of capitalism. In this way we can begin to find the fault lines in the
conclusion of Sayed-Khaiyum, who posits as a desideratum the ending of cultural autonomy and
the need to fully participate on the global stage as a liberal nation-state.
However, here we can sketch a critique of the nation-state within the context of
development, capitalism, and the specific context of Fiji. In his book The Structure of World
History (2014), Kojin Karatani lays out an argument that the toppling of monarchies in the
bourgeois revolutions of 1848 obscured the inter-connection of economy and politics, allowing
the emergent nation-state to appear as if it is independent of economic interplay. Recovering this
intimate connection between state and capital allows us to see the nation-state as a particular
form of enforcement for the interests of capital. This is shown throughout history, including in
‘real socialist’ countries. Bookchin (2004) points out, in his critique of actually existing
socialism, that even these states did not take significant steps to abolish capitalism, but merely
centralized it into a form of “state capitalism”, with its attendant bureaucracies and class
exploitation.
This connection can be seen clearly in how the tension between cultural autonomy and
the state tends to play out along economic lines—in addition to other forms of hierarchical
exploitation. Strengthening the nation-state will deepen the penetration of the capitalist economy
into the land of Fiji, both literally and metaphorically. Thus, adopting a critique of development
and capitalism as exploitative of peoples must also include a critique of the nation-state: “The
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design of the nation-state, the ideal arena for the creation and expansion of capitalism, has
become an obstacle in the era of globalization” (Esteva, et al., 2013). This turns many arguments
about the stability of Fiji on its head, as many theorists take all three of these factors to be
desirable for Fiji. If we upset these conclusions, then a lot of the rationale behind disempowering
the cultural autonomy of the iTaukei becomes nonsensical. Indeed, as has been shown by recent
indigenous movements around the world in places like Chiapas, Northern Syria (Rojava), and
Turkish Kurdistan (Bakur), cultural autonomy can be a model for stateless, directly democratic
peoples (Egret & Anderson, 2016; Escobar, 2012; Knapp, et al, 2016; Öcalan, 2015) . This is
also flourishing in non-indigenous communities, such as in Portland, Barcelona, and Venezuela
(Ciccariello-Maher, 2016).
We can see from this analysis that interpenetrating conflicts between Eastern and
Western iTaukei, between chiefly and common, between iTaukei and Indo-Fijian (kindled and
enflamed largely by the power elite of the iTaukei) erupt as the globalized capitalist economy
sinks deeper into Fiji. This causes a cyclical rupture of ‘development’ where iTaukei are pushed
to homogenize into the liberal nation-state framework, but react by falling back onto ethnonationalism and a desire for paramountcy above others. This has led to four coups, each resulting
in the steady weakening of the iTaukei Administration, culminating in the dissolution of the
Great Council of Chiefs, a suspension of village bylaws, and an increase of land lease length
from 21 to 99 years.

The Current Landscape: Status of Fiji and the Fijian Administration

The current Fiji First Party (FF), led by the onetime coup maker Voreqe Bainimarama
represents a homogenizing push to turn Fiji into a stable nation-state, ready to participate in the
global market by dismantling institutions within the Ministry of iTaukei Affairs. In 2012
Bainimarama officially abolished the GCC, after having suspended it in 2007 after his coup.
During this decree, he officially made the term ‘Fijian’ apply to all born in Fiji, while noting that
‘iTaukei’ would refer to indigenous peoples (Field, 2012). In 2018, Bainimara suspended
consultations for creating updated and official village bylaws (Cava, 2018). This was after many
rounds of consultation with various regional, political and NGO groups in preparation for their
update and reimplementation under the new constitution. In addition, land controlled by the
TLTB has begun to be effectively alienated through 99-year leases: "the government has set up
Committee on Better Utilization of Land (CBUL) and the Land Use Unit, which is responsible
for the ‘land bank’ scheme. CBUL seeks to identify idle land to bring it into productive use.
Land-owners voluntarily designate land that they do not need and also indicate their preferred
use of the land. The state then leases out the land to investors for up to 99 years” (Naidu, 2013, p.
16).
This neoliberal restructuring has been opposed by Sitiveni Rabuka (leader of both 1987
coups) and the Social Democratic Liberal Party (SODEPLA), formed in 2013. This party is
explicitly an ethno-nationalist party, and have promised to abrogate the newest constitution of
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Fiji, calling it illegitimate and having been forced on the people during the reign of Bainimarama
(Ratuva & Lawson, 2016). The party has promised to bring back communal voting and forcing a
specific ethnic makeup of parliament. This is expressly counter to liberal democratic notions of
universal role voting, where citizens are free to choose candidates regardless of ethnic
background. Vandana Shiva (2016) makes the point that: “Representative democracy in this
context [of economic globalization] becomes increasingly shaped and driven by cultural
nationalism. Cultural Nationalism emerges as the twin of economic globalization” (p. 65).
In the 2014 elections, for the iTaukei people “was between SODELPA’s conservative
cultural preservation approach or FF’s cultural transformation and socioeconomic modernisation
strategy” (Ratuva & Lawson, 2016, p. 36). The choices presented by the nation-state are revealed
in their limitations. As Shiva (2016) points out: “Politicians must win elections but cannot
intervene in economic processes on behalf of the public. Instead of economic justice, they
therefore capitalize on cultural and religious identity and insecurity” (p. 72). As such, the iTaukei
people have been pushed by first the British, and then Fijian government to join the cash
economy by getting jobs in the cities, signing long-term leases on mataqali land to be
productively developed, and to rely on the government (Naidu, 2013; Sayed-Khaiyum, 2002), as
opposed to the grassroots direct democracy associated with the iTaukei bose. In this milieu of
swirling ethnic conflict and capitalist development the roots of ethno-nationalism are nourished
and allowed to grow. The real test of whether Fiji has been liberalized enough to overcome its
stigma of being an unstable state will come once a peaceful transfer of power happens. This
would represent a new party displacing the dominant one without triggering another coup. This
has yet to happen in Fiji in its post-colonial history, as whenever power has been transferred
from the dominant party to a challenger, a coup has occurred.
I was in the country during the 2018 elections, and was surprised at how tense the
country was, yet how placid the village was. In reading newspapers and articles online, the
rhetoric from both SODELPA and FF were negative, and the shadow of the previous coups hung
over all of it, receiving mention from time to time. A few months before the election, Fiji First
held an extensive program in the West of giving out disaster funding in relation to the recent (but
relatively small) Cyclone Keni. Families were entitled to up to $2,000 FJD. While I have not
seen anything linking it explicitly, the timing of funds dispersal is not something I would count
as coincidence. I was given special instructions by the Peace Corps staff to be ready to leave the
country in the event of a coup, and my travel was restricted for weeks before and after the
election. Yet in the village, there was very little discussion of politics or of the situation at all,
even when I was able to ask benign questions or listen in on conversations during kava sessions.
One of the few instances when politics became salient was when the parties would come to the
village and host meetings in the community hall, to explain their positions and give out materials
and swag. I was forbidden from attending these by the Peace Corps staff, so I was only able to
hear about them secondhand from friends in the village.
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A Social Ecological Critique
Using a social ecological method of inquiry, let’s look at the iTaukei Administration, the
nation-state of Fiji, and the ongoing penetration of the capitalist economy. So far we have
examined the tensions inherent in the iTaukei Administration, its effect on the colonial and
nation-state project, and how it has been an brake on ‘development’ (consumption of land and
labor for the global market), as well as how these weaknesses have contributed to state failure.
First, as has been established, the iTaukei Administration was established in an effort partially to
preserve iTaukei culture, and partially to facilitate easier colonial rule. However the former was
at odds with the needs of the capitalist ventures of the British, and thus Indian workers were
brought in to ensure the profitability of the colony. Again, this importation of peoples has been a
source of conflict, and has been a factor in four separate coups—indeed a significant factor in the
weakness of Fiji as a nation-state. The cultural autonomy of the iTaukei has been a fissure in the
supposed unity of the ‘Nation-State’, if the Nation is separate from the State, then weakness must
necessarily result. The Indo-Fijians have much less robust institutionalized cultural protections,
bringing them closer in line with the nation-state, this also precludes any specific cultural
autonomy in behalf of the Indo-Fijian or Rotuman peoples.
The submerged assumption behind both Marxist and liberal forms of development
discourse is one of teleology. That in order to break the chains of tribalism and the blood tie, we
must progress through stages of development—from monarchy to liberal democracy (and for
Marx, to then progress to communism) (Bookchin et al, 2015, p. 20). We see this same logic
played out in the development of discourse—countries must progress through industrial stages in
order to join the ‘developed world’. This process mirrors the development of the West in a
disturbingly narcissistic way. However, this telos has been challenged in a number of different
ways; as stated by Escobar (2012): “Development assumes a teleology to the extent that it
proposes that the “natives” will sooner or later be reformed; at the same time, however, it
reproduces endlessly the separation between reformers and those to be reformed…” (p. 53). In
addition, the social ecological mode of inquiry eschews this notion of telos, that there are
specific stages countries and people must progress through in order to ‘develop’.
Vandana Shiva (2016) points out that non-Western modes of cultivation and consumption
are excluded from development discourses, where people have no income but live off the land
and use traditional materials to construct housing and other living spaces, they are seen as living
in misery and poverty by Western eyes. “The organizing principles of development based on
economic growth render valueless all resources and resource processes that are not priced in the
market and are not inputs to commodity production. This premise very often generates economic
development programs that divert or destroy the resources base for survival” (Shiva, 2016, p.
43). This is clearly seen in my experience living in an iTaukei village. Families have farms,
where they harvest cassava, dalo, and other local foods as needed, planting more and weeding as
necessary. They take extra to a local market in order to get money, or gather the seasonal fruits
like mango, guava, and papaya to take to bigger towns. Houses have traditionally been made of
local materials, though this has been affected in the last decade due to climate change and
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increasingly intense cyclones. This is necessitating the use of more expensive materials such as
cinder blocks and large amounts of cement.
From this we can see the hollowness of using income as a method of tracking
development. If one has the means for living available to them, but makes limited cash income,
they are seen as living in poverty—where taking people out of their cultural context, forcing
them into the wage economy and taking away means of living may constitute a success of
development. This has been pointed out handily by Jason Hickel, in a 2019 article addressing the
creation of global poverty and its reduction. In it he discusses the claim put out by Bill Gates and
Steven Pinker that “the proportion of people living in poverty has declined from 94% in 1820 to
only 10% today” (Hickel, 2019). He describes this formulation as the creation of needs through
forcing colonized peoples out of commonly held ecologies and into forced labor for paltry
wages. What we see, so far as development metrics are concerned, millions of people ‘living
below the poverty line’ economically, yet living richly sustainable, ecological (if sometimes
hard) lives.
The cultural autonomy of the iTaukei has provided an institutional barrier to the
penetration of the capitalist economy into the land and villages around Fiji, leaving a large
number of iTaukei people working as subsistence farmers, and not participating in waged labor,
or participating at-will and returning to their community. This is not the case for the Indo-Fijians,
who must either purchase the land not under control of the TLTB, or lease from the TLTB. This
produces a de facto need to participate in waged labor and the capitalist economy. In this way,
the iTaukei are viewed as under-developed because they do not hit the standards put forth by the
creators of development discourse—yet the extent to which they are actually materially suffering
has plenty of room for discussion and nuance.
Access to land and food are relatively easy, and the major factors affecting the iTaukei
people are ones that result from being “developed”. Non-communicable diseases caused by poor
diet and lack of exercise is the highest cause of death in Fiji and 1 in 3 Fijians are diagnosed with
diabetes (Ministry of Health, 2019) In addition, rates of suicide (Ministry of Health, 2019) and
domestic violence (Bo, 2018) are among the highest in the world. According to a 2007 UNICEF
report, these trends come from the tensions of families being pressured to join the labor force,
resulting from an increase in urbanization combined with stagnation of wages. These issues are
serious, and must be confronted and dealt with. But they all have common origin—they are the
indicators of a nation experiencing development—more bluntly, they are the effects of a society
confronting the dislocation and devolution engendered the global marketplace. In looking at
reports like the one just cited, we find that health risks like NCDs, suicide, and domestic violence
increase alongside efforts of ‘development’. The diagnosis of these reports, paradoxically,
usually shakes out to be more and varied forms of ‘development’.
The goal of Peace Corps in Fiji is to help create better health and sanitation habits in the
villages. As such, much of my service has been tailored to education on various aspects of health
and sanitation. One of the major impacts on the health of iTaukei people in my village is one of
diet. A typical breakfast for adults and children is crackers put in cups of tea. It is common for
people to put 3-4 heaping spoons of sugar into a cup of tea, and have two or three at a sitting.
Hall 45

Even after two years, people are still visibly shocked when they notice that I don’t take sugar
with my tea. As part of my integration, I had to start keeping sugar in my house for times when
people came for tea. I realized this when people would ask for sugar, and when I apologized that
I didn’t have any, they left the cup untouched. Lunch is usually similar fare, crackers or bread
with butter, or cake. In a more traditional vein, some families have a few cassava for a meal,
which doesn’t have much nutritional value on its own. There is a lot of snacking on processed
foods like chips, candies, or dry ramen. A lot of the Fijian diet involves fish and coconuts, but
since we are in the mountains fish is rare and coconut trees don’t grow well (some say due to the
altitude, other say the introduction of horses have stunted coconut reproduction), the average diet
here is filled with processed wheat and sugar. Special events and Sundays bring a wider variety
of food, with greens and meat being served along with cassava and dalo.

Social Ecology and Development

The current landscape of global development is in something of a flux—while many
organizations like the UNDP, USAID, and various NGOs continue to push for ‘development-asusual’ there is an increasingly insistent call for a transition to something else. The call is coming,
not from major organizations, but from grassroots movements and communities around the
globe. This takes many forms, from Escobar (2012) discussing “postdevelopment” or pluriversal
creation, and the importance of going beyond liberal and capitalistic notions of development
discourse to Vandana Shiva (2016) and her explication of “Earth Democracy” as an alternative to
western globalized development. It is in this exciting ferment of possibilities that social ecology
may enter.
In The Anthropology of Utopia, Dan Chodorkoff states that social ecology “understands
the elimination of all relationships based on hierarchy and domination as an integral part of the
development process, and as the starting point for a reharmonization of people’s relationship
with the rest of nature” (2014). He goes on to lay out some tendencies that social ecological
development would hold: unity-in-diversity, non-hierarchical relationships, mutualism,
spontaneity and co-evolution. The principle of unity-in-diversity is a guide to encourage the
flourishing of diverse and local cultures as a way to ensure a fecund cultural ecosystem. This is
in contravention to the current understanding of development as teleological—cultures must pass
out of backwardness and into ‘modernity’. This is essentially a homogenization process that
turns societies into a monoculture, reflecting the monoculture of the land under ‘development’.
SE rejects such a teleology, and instead affirms that communities and regions should be
empowered directly to choose what, how, and when they would like to ‘develop’.
Since Fiji’s decolonization there has been a fissure in the nation and the state, creating a
weakness and state collapse when these two circles come into conflict. The solution of Voreqe
Bainimarama and the Fiji First government since the 2006 coup has been to reduce the cultural
autonomy of the iTaukei, disbanding the GCC and the village bylaws that have served as the top
and bottom of the dual power structure. We can separate these two things out by understanding
the GCC as an institution of hierarchical domination, designed to reduce the living culture of the
iTaukei into something held exclusively by an elite class. However, the local bose is an ideal site
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for an evolving and variegated culture to thrive, through institutions of direct democracy. The
logic of capital requires that land becomes available on the market, and the iTaukei must enter
waged labor in order to become “developed”, their labor generating wealth to inflate the GDP of
Fiji. As the country proves that it is more stable, investors will become more interested in
investing and industrializing Fiji, as it is placed advantageously as the hub of Oceania. This
brings the iTaukei people closer in line with the state itself, reducing the tension of the nation
and state, allowing for the liberalization of Fiji as a whole and to allow deeper penetration of the
globalized capitalist economy. Yet it also produces the reactionary creation of an exclusionary
ethno-nationalism, identifying problems within the liberal nation-state yet prescribing a return to
a fictional golden age of undiluted culture.
However, as we have seen, this is little more than a pathway to have resources extracted
and actually sets people on a treadmill of exploitation. Indeed, this has been the impetus of the
discourse of development surrounding Fiji since Europeans first landed. The conflict of the
communal culture in Fiji and the capitalist economy has been shown to be irreconcilable. But,
we can expand this critique further to incorporate not just the economic and cultural, but to the
state itself. There are compelling arguments that point to the explosion of nation-states created
after colonization and the simultaneous creation of development discourse after World War II as
method of continuing the colonial project (Bookchin et al, 2015; Escobar, 2012; Öcalan, 2017;
Shiva, 2016). Many of the nation-states were created as a result of Western pressure, and the
economic exploitation of them through the narrative of development have left these countries
with crippling debt and an easy method of resource and labor extraction. As these things
continue, we see a rising tide of conservative revolt against the exploitation, harnessed usually in
reactionary racism and fundamentalism.
Given the above analysis, we can reframe discussions of ‘development’ in Fiji to be
directly tied and many cases explicitly a cover for ‘capitalist development’. Taking a pillar of
pluriversal creation as well as of social ecology, can see that capitalism itself institutes
devolution of many different kinds—cultural, ecological, relational, and economic. It grows like
cancer, absorbing and killing its host. Because of this, a social ecological theory of development
must be extremely discerning in discussions of development, since they are most commonly
framed in terms of (capitalist) economic growth and commercialism. The origins of Fijian
developmental discourse are steeped in this assumption, and as has been pointed out above, have
been a driving factor in inflaming both inter and intra-ethnic tensions.
So, let us take as a case study a report on the need for Fijian rural development called
Breaking Fiji’s Coup Culture through Effective Rural Development (2019). In it, the author sets
up one of the main factors for the coups as a lack of rural development, and the perception by
rural Fijians (overwhelmingly iTakei) that the incoming regime will support rural development
better than the previous administration (p. 400-402). This in some respects is true, but as my
earlier analysis of the manifold of conflicts point out, ‘rural development’ means more than
anything facilitating the penetration of market capitalism. It should come as no surprise, then,
that the same language used by British colonists is still being used in developmental discourse
today: “Indigenous Fijians in many parts of the country require capital, infrastructure, experience
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and skills, managerial expertise, and hard work and dedication [emphasis added] to be
successful (Veitayaki, 2019, p. 415).
The author goes on to state that in that in villages: “Community work takes up a
significant portion of time, which takes people away from their individual pursuits” (Veitayaki,
2019, p. 419). We can see in this the same colonial theorizing of the indigenous community as
lazy, childlike and too communally oriented to receive development properly. “A lot of the
reserved native land is unutilised as people have only small gardens because they do not have the
means to maximise their production” (Veitayaki, 2019, p. 409). So, the problem of coup culture
is the tensions of capital and culture, and the resolution is to privilege capital over culture: “…the
poor state of the markets and infrastructure, and people’s customs and traditions hinder the
operation of profit-making ventures in rural areas” (Veitayaki, 2019, p. 412). This quote lays
naked the tensions in play, as well as the implicit conclusion that profit-making is the end of
development. In a social ecological theory of development, individual profit-motive is not an
appropriate indicator of success—economic indicators would be able to track communal
wellbeing, ecological and personal health and safety, and access to the means of life common to
all. Above all, economy itself would be re-embedded into social life, so that economies may
become democratized and start to serve life.
According to the stated goals of Sayed-Khaiyum (2002), current Attorney General of the
Fijian government, the cultural autonomy of the iTaukei people must have a sunset clause, and
we can see from the policies enacted by the Fiji First government that this is being carried out in
preparation for a more thorough integration in the globalized market. The opposing view
politically is the SODELPA party, where the iTaukei should be paramount to the exclusion (or
subordination) of Indo-Fijian and other nations in Fiji. This is in line with the rising tide of
reactionary movements and attempts to purify the nation-state—witness the movements of ISIS,
Brazil, Israel, Turkey, and the United States in working to exclude ethnic and cultural groups
seen as ‘inferior’ or ‘dangerous’.
This is where the social ecological point of view comes into play. Capitalism, and its
attendant enforcement structure of the nation-state have come up against in Fiji a cultural
structure that, although it has been simplified and enmeshed with British Colonialism, still poses
a threat to the penetration of waged labor and the commodification of land. There is beyond a
doubt need for development of some kind within Fiji, the previous arguments should not be seen
as a defense of the status quo, nor to put rose-tinted glasses on the rural and urban populations of
Fiji. If anything, the above analysis should expose the manifold tensions at play that get
simplified when Fiji is theorized in current development discourses about the need for economic
development.
Fundamentally, the creation of the development paradigm was the creation of scarcity. In
The Future of Development, the authors state that: “A catastrophic destitution, dispossessing
people of their way of life, is the precondition for every modern ‘need’ (and thus the root cause
of modernized poverty). Market society operates through the creation of scarcity, which in turn
shapes all needs, usually through dispossession” (Esteva, et al., 2013). This analysis comes from
an understanding that a teleological development into a Western-style nation-state cannot be
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sustained, nor is a possibility. The massive consumption of the United Stated states is based on
the inability of consumption by the Global South (Esteva, et al., 2013). This is in total
contravention of a social ecological model, the cornerstone of which is post-scarcity (Bookchin,
2004). As a cornerstone of the social ecological outlook, post-scarcity is the understanding that
the current level of technological achievement makes possible the end of material scarcity. Not
through hyper-consumption, but the sensitive and ecological application of renewable power,
agroecology, and a production for use (as opposed to profit) can help ferment a post-ecological
society. The only thing truly lacking is the political will to make it so.
The social ecological stance on the nation-state is that it is an inherent institution of
domination and control. It exists to propagate and support capitalist expansion, and as such one
cannot be anti-capitalist without being against the state. This view is supported by Esteva, et al.
(2013), Öcalan (2017), and discussed as possible alternatives by both Arturo Escobar (2012) and
Vandana Shiva (2016). They all discuss this in terms of indigenous struggle for autonomy
against the nation-state. In this particular paradigm, we see the continual failure of the nationstate to provide for a “radical pluralism” (Esteva, et al., 2013), “living cultures” (Shiva, 2016),
“transition discourses” (Escobar, 2012), or “unity-in-diversity” (Bookchin, 2005). These phrases
have differentiating nuances, but can largely be placed together as similar explications of the
same phenomenon. Within this search for autonomy, we can situate the iTaukei cultural
autonomy. What we see occurring is the reduction of indigenous autonomy into a dehumanizing
neoliberal monoculture, the result of capitalist colonization through the Trojan horse of
‘development’. This in turn, as pointed out above by Shiva, creates a negative culture and
identity, based on a reactionary stance to economic dehumanization. This creates the grounds for
the current paradigm we see in Fiji (and echoed around the world) of a neoliberal push opposed
by a reactionary nationalism.
As part of this rejection comes a resurgence of the local, situated within the global. This
is a conceptualization of local culture and spaces that are interdependent with localities around
the world. This is codified in social ecology as a confederal network of municipalities, ecoregions, or communes. In this, we can see the parallels of the Fijian Administration to the
structure of democratic assemblies of villages, towns and cities confederated together in
contravention to the state. Even given the latent form of the village bose, and its district and
provincial counterparts, they still pose a direct challenge to the state itself, being at the nexus of
the manifold conflicts within Fiji. There is no doubt that in their current state (especially at the
provincial level) they are riven with graft, hierarchy, and susceptible to parochialism as
Rotuivaqali (2012) lays out in her detailed work on provincial accountability in Fiji. Yet this
does not in itself negate the potential of the institution as a libertatory body.
But what of nationalism itself? This is a question that has been grappled with on the Left
for some time, whether the support of nationalist projects constitutes a sufficiently radical
project. On this subject, we can see the difference between social ecology and other frameworks,
like Marxism. Bookchin (2015) states that nationalism is a step along the path to the recognition
of a universal humanitas—as humanity has moved beyond the blood tie and kinship bonds as the
basis for differentiating ‘people’ from the ‘other’, so too nationalism must be moved past for
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internationalism. This does not mean a homogenizing ‘oneness’ of culture and ethnicity
however, far from it: “We are obliged to formulate an ethics of complentarity in which cultural
differentia mutualistically serve to enhance human unity itself, in short, that constitute a new
mosaic of vigorous cultures that enrich the human condition and that foster its advance…”
(Bookchin et al, 2015, p 110). Further, he states that “Cultural freedom and variety, let me
emphasize, should not be confused with nationalism. That specific peoples should be free to fully
develop their own cultural capacities is not merely a right but a desideratum.” (Bookchin et al,
2015, p. 110).
Through this paper I have attempted to show the extent to which current conceptions of
what is ‘traditional’ iTaukei culture (espoused by ethno-nationalist parties like SODELPA) have
were created through colonialism, as well as how some structures of colonialism have liberatory
potential in them. In this way I want to highlight the complex, interpenetrating legacy of both
freedom and domination and how they have already been synthesized into a neotraditional
culture. This is the heart of a social ecological critique—while it is not for me (as an observer of
Fijian lifeways) to decree what is and is not good for the people of Fiji, I want to open a space
for discourse by those creators and holders of Fijian lifeways on the potential for synthesizing a
more liberatory path—with the dissolution of hierarchy and a generative relationship with the
biotic world—and how it does not have to be a weakening or compromise of cultural integrity.
So, in a social ecological conception, cultural autonomy is not the issue per se, but that only one
culture in Fiji has autonomy. In allowing for autonomous multi-ethnic consociation, we can
begin to sketch the other paths that benefit all parties. This type of inter-ethnic autonomy is the
foundation upon which the Self-Administration of Northern Syria is built—with allowances for
cultural integrity socially and inter-cultural solidarity politically—as well as many other
movements such as Buen Vivir, Ubuntu, and Swaraj.

Conclusion
The structure of the Fijian Administration from villages to district to province, along with
the election process for attending provincial councils mirrors the structure Bookchin discusses in
The Nest Revolution (2015) where he talks about creating a Commune of communes through
confederated networks based on municipal citizen assemblies. This structure also bares close
resemblance to the structure of Cantons in Northern Syria, also known as Rojava (See Appendix
I for more details). As covered above, this structure is one imposed by British Colonialism, one
that was meant to mirror traditional structures but to appropriate them for the indirect rule
strategy employed by the British Empire at that time. While these structures are colonial in
nature, they have been assimilated into iTaukei tradition much the same way Christianity has.
These structures represent what Bookchin discussed as a ‘form of freedom’, one that can be
filled with liberatory or hierarchical content. Such structures have been used by the Cantons in
Rojava to create an inclusive, multicultural society while preserving heterogeneous cultural
autonomy.
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We can look at a hypothetical social ecological political/economic structure that closely
mirrors the iTaukei Administration shorn of its Statecraft elements. The structure of
village/community bose fits the conception of directly democratic councils, and serve as the
anchor and place of power for decision making. The process of talanoa and deliberation is useful
for paideia, or the self-conscious process of forming people into active participants and managers
of their community. This is a crucial process in social ecology, because unlike anarchism it
doesn’t theorize spontaneous human nature to be ready to self-manage once oppressive systems
are deconstructed; nor does it hold that the factory is the site of revolutionary discipline as with
Marxism. The ability for local boses to democratically pick recallable delegates to send to tikina
and yasana councils would ensure that power stays with the local, as opposed to the current
conception of power residing at the top. The ability for provincial councils to create and maintain
cooperatives represents Libertarian Municipalism potential—for production and economic
activity to take place on a human scale, with ethical distribution playing over profit. In Fiji, the
conception of the Vanua as a harmonic unity of people, place, and spirit lays out the potential
ethical bent of municipalized production.
Discourses of de-colonizing and activating parts of a culture is something that is best
carried out by groups affected by these issues, and as such I cannot in good faith make any
prescriptions or definitive claims on what ‘ought’ to happen. This is a point well taken, and I
wish to stress it. I think that it can be useful to point out some conclusions, and illustrate some
possibilities. For one thing, it is useful to point out that land rights before Cession were
something fluid, something to be negotiated and, at worst, fought over. They were ossified into a
bureaucratic structure by the creation of the Separate Administration, and given over to the
management of mataqali as a matter of institutional convenience. It is also worth noting that the
many cultures and ethnicities of Fiji were for long years before Cession relatively peaceful and
inclusive—Fiji is at the crux of Melanesian and Polynesian migration, and each island/region has
different ethnic make-up, homogenized as the ‘iTaukei’ only after the fact for bureaucratic
simplicity. As such, one can imagine, not a naïve return to some ‘golden age’ but a recognition
that unity-in-diversity is something deeply held, and can be used to expand communal landholding to include those who have come to Fiji after Cession—Indo-Fijians, Rotumans, and
others. This is meant as an example to show that there are many more paths to walk than the two
paths laid out before Fiji by the State—one of cultural homogenization through the intrusion of
globalized capital, or of ethno-centricity and isolation and an impossible return to the past.
As shown above, the very existence of the iTaukei Administration has contributed to state
weakness and instability, even in a latent form riven with methods of domination and control. It
was put in place as a measure to preserve communal culture and to retard the growth of
capitalism, and has continued to do so to the detriment of the nation-state project. Built within
the iTaukei Administration is a mélange of traditional, colonial, and neo-traditional systems, the
base of which is the village bose and its practice of talanoa and honoring the vanua. At the
center of the manifold of conflict explained above sits this administration—the eye of an ever
evolving storm. While currently land is held at the matagali level of tribal configuration, one can
see the potential for inter- and intra-ethnic solidarity through further decentralization and
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communing of land and resources, granting cultural autonomy to not one ethnic group, but each
one on its own terms.
In order for the liberal nation-state to reach a point of stability, it must have capitalism as
its base of economic organization, which is why the last decade we have seen the erosion of this
institution; a preparation for a homogenization of culture within Fiji to suit the needs of a global
marketplace. In reaction to this, there has been an ethno-nationalist push to reclaim Fiji for the
iTaukei, to the exclusion of others. This is a common development when, as Vandana Shiva
points out, that economic exploitation creates negative identities and cultures, leading to
reactionary nationalism. These are not the only two paths, however. The way has been chartered
by indigenous movements around the world that it is possible to create a liberatory and inclusive
culture that preserves cultural autonomy by allowing it to grow and evolve with other cultures.
For Öcalan this is called the Democratic Nation, and for Bookchin it is the principle of unity-indiversity.
Taking this, and looking at potential takeaways for those outside the Fijian context, we
see the absolute importance of control of land by the community. In Fiji it is controlled by clans,
and excludes non-indigenous groups, but the potential for municipalization of land can be seen in
the TLTB. This is increasingly important as a site of resistance given the hyper-financialization
of real estate around the world. In addition, we can see how the creation of institutional forms of
direct democracy can help maintain and generate resistance to capital, and create weaknesses
within the nation-state that can be supplanted with non-state institutions of economic, political,
ecological, and cultural democracy. It also shows the need to understand directly democratic
institutions as separate from more hierarchical state structures. Another takeaway for those
hesitant to engage with theories of power and engagement with the state is the inside-outside
nature of the iTauke Administration, and how engaging in this governmental structure can be
useful to help maintain a directly democratic method of decision making, while at the same time
understanding the separation of the grassroots from the more hierarchal structures that exist
above it.

Hall 52

Appendix I
Graphic of Rojava governance structure

Source: Egret & Anderson, 2016
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(Organization). (2017). The Political Thought of Abdullah Öcalan: Kurdistan, Woman's
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